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ABSTRACT 
 
Retaliation as a trade remedy has been used since the inception of an International 
Trading System, the GATT. However, the history of the GATT reveals that retaliation as 
a trade remedy was barely used, and among the reasons cited for the non-use of the 
remedy, are its cost implication versus the benefit, and the fact that as a remedy, 
retaliation has reverse effects that can be more detrimental to the complainant more than 
the respondent, especially if the former is a small country. To-date, retaliation as a 
remedy is still used as the last resort remedy, with the same old complaints of its 
shortcomings and yet, so far there appears to be no consensus on how best to utilize the 
remedy or improve upon it, bearing in mind the inequality of power amongst the 
members, that is the developed, developing and least developed countries. 
 
This study was undertaken to investigate the feasibility of retaliation as a trade remedy. 
Throughout the study, the usefulness of retaliation as a remedy is pronounced, the fact 
that it poses a threat, and hence acts as a deterrence mechanism to would be offenders. 
Prima facie, its weaknesses as a remedy seem to overwhelm the entire credibility of the 
remedy. In addition to existing literature, the study was facilitated by use of a self-
administered questionnaire, through purposeful/ judgmental sampling. Forty-three 
respondents completed the self-administered questionnaire. The study focused on the 
practicability of retaliation as a remedy, first by examining the essence of the remedy, 
and what situation warrants locus for a complainant to retaliate. The study also examined 
the proposals put forward by the developing countries in a bid to improve retaliation as a 
remedy. 
 
The study revealed that even though retaliation as a trade remedy has colossal drawbacks 
de facto, it is overwhelmingly vouched for retention as a remedy due to the restraining 
role it plays to as a threat to reluctant Members. The study further revealed that the WTO 
Members, in spite of the various proposals in improving retaliation as a trade remedy, 
 vii
have not come to a consensus, as to the suitability of the much-debated proposals and 
how they would be implemented, if at all. The findings in the study reveal that much as 
compensation is advocated for as an alternative to retaliation as a remedy, it would face a 
serious problem regarding enforcement of the same, as there would be no way of 
compelling a sovereign to comply with the compensatory order. 
 
As a result, a major finding herein was made regarding the reluctance of the WTO 
Members to have an exclusive, effective dispute settlement system with viable remedies. 
Once faced with non-compliance of the DSB recommendations and failure in 
compensation, and with the inability of a complainant to resort to retaliation as a remedy, 
the complainant has no alternative in restoring the balance of the nullified concessions. 
 
Arising from the findings, it is recommended that the WTO Members consider revising 
the suitability of the remedies available under the DSU. The need for revising the 
available remedies should be to achieve the main objective of the WTO and primarily, of 
the DSU, to ensure the rebalancing of trade concessions between the Member parties. As 
is shown by the study, if continued use of retaliation undermines the rights and 
obligations of the Members so gravely, that shunning away from the system is an option, 
the credibility of the entire system overtime shall be affected. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Study 
This study was undertaken to establish the feasibility of retaliation as a trade 
remedy under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, and its effectiveness 
in dispute resolution. Public International Law has long recognized the duty of 
governments to repair or remedy damage they have caused. The Permanent Court 
of International Justice stated the principle in the Factory at Chorzow Case 
being that, “Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed.”1 The draft Articles of the 
International Law Commission on State Responsibility provide that, “The 
responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury 
caused by the internationally wrongful act.2”  This could entail pecuniary 
compensation or restitution in kind.   
 
As shown above, retaliation is one way of International Public Law of making 
good the damage occasioned to trading Members under the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). It is deemed part 
of a corpus of International Economic Law as evidently submitted by Mosoti,3 to 
secure the long-term predictability of trading concessions and interests in the 
international legal system. It is a last resort trade remedy as stipulated under 
Article 3 (7) of the DSU4, and expressly provided for as a remedy under Article 
22 (2).  
 
 
1 P.C.I.J. (Ser A) No. 17 at Page 47- 48 
2 Report of the International Law Commission 132, Article 31 (United Nations, 2000)  
3 Mosoti V., Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement. Oxford University Press 2006, Journal  
  of International Economic Law 2006 9 (427) at Pg. 4 
4 Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and  
   Procedures Governing The Settlement Of Disputes 
 2
                                                
The essence of retaliation is when a country, if found responsible for a trade 
violation, is asked to eliminate policies that are deemed to be in violation of WTO 
rules. In the event that it fails to comply, it is asked to compensate countries 
harmed by its violation by granting tariff concessions in goods other than the one 
in which the violation has been found to occur. If injured Members are not 
adequately compensated, WTO rules permit them to impose retaliatory tariffs, 
that is, to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such 
concessions or other obligations under the Agreement as they determine to be 
appropriate under the circumstances.5 The party upon whom retaliation is visited 
has the liberty, not later than sixty days after such action is taken, to give written 
notice to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties, of its intention to 
withdraw from the Agreement, and such withdrawal takes effect upon the sixtieth 
day, following the day on which such notice is received by him.6  
 
In carrying out the study, it became pertinent to examine the institutions that 
administer retaliation as a trade remedy, which are the GATT and the WTO. The 
GATT is the parent agreement of the WTO that was established in 1948 in 
Havana, which emerged as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The 
WTO dispute settlement system (DSS) was established in 1995 during the 
Uruguay Round as part of the Marrakech Agreement.7 The practice under the 
GATT with regard to remedies was inconsistent. Panels usually recommended 
that the offender bring its measure into conformity with the relevant provision of 
the General Agreement or the relevant Tokyo Round Code. This remedy usually 
was prospective only, providing no relief for past damages suffered.8  If a GATT 
contracting party failed to bring its measure into conformity, the remedy was 
“Compensation” from the offending party to the victim, in the form of reduced 
 
5 The General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade, 1994, Article 23 (2) 
6 Ibid, Article 23 (2) 
7 Incorporated in Annex 2 of the Agreement, as the Understanding on Rules & Procedures governing the  
   Settlement of Disputes 
8 Palmeter D. & Mavroidis Petros C., Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation, Practice &  
   Procedure (2d Ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004), at Pg. 163  
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barriers on other products, or “Retaliation” by the victim in the form of increased 
barriers against imports from the offending party. 
The one and only time in the history of the GATT when retaliation as a trade 
remedy was invoked9 was in 1952 when GATT condemned the United States 
restrictions on milk imports on the grounds that they were not necessary and, 
contrary to the provisions of Article XI.2 (c).10 The Netherlands was allowed to 
take retaliatory measures against the US. However, in the face of the US threat to 
withdraw from GATT, Holland gave up applying any sanctions. 
 
As was the case with GATT, “Compensation” and “Suspension of Concessions” 
or other “Obligations” are the remedies made available by the DSU when a 
Member fails to bring a non-conforming measure into compliance with DSB 
recommendations and rulings within a reasonable period of time. Compensation 
typically takes the form of a reduction in tariffs or other trade barriers, on a non-
Most Favored Nation basis, against the non-complying Member by the successful 
complainant. It is provided that both compensation and suspension of concessions 
are considered to be temporary measures, and that neither is preferred to full 
implementation.11  
 
The WTO system is generally limited to orders for Specific Performance and Ex-
nunc termination of the unlawful measures.12 It should be noted that the remedy 
provisions were not drawn in terms of sanctions. Instead, the organizing principle 
of GATT was that it was a system of reciprocal rights and obligations to be 
maintained in balance.13 However, a matter of grave concern to a scholar and in 
this study is; how can these reciprocal rights and obligations be maintained in 
balance, where a member suffers from impairment of its rights, and it is only 
compensated prospectively, with no remedy to past harm? The ability of the WTO 
 
9 Fabian Delcros, The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organisation, State of Play at   the  
   Start of Negotiations, Journal of World Trade 36 (2): 219-253, 2002, at pg. 222 
10 Dairy Products from Holland, BISD, Vol. II (1952) 116 
11 Articles 3(7) and 22(1) of the DSU 
12 Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation, Procedural Aspects of Formal Dispute Settlement, Cameron May  
    2002, at Pg. 89 
13 Ibid, at Pg. 89, this principle is maintained in Article 3(3) of the DSU 
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to authorize trade retaliation as a reaction to unrelenting violations is a salient and 
a most ironical and controversial feature of the DSU.  
 
Although there are constraints on the amount of retaliation permitted by the 
WTO, the fact that the dispute settlement procedure even allows tariff retaliation 
appears to be in direct conflict with the notion of liberalization of trade. The 
preceding statement and the fact that many small countries cannot effectively 
retaliate via tariffs, have led to calls for alternative trade dispute remedies. 
With the inception of the WTO in 1995 the world trading system witnessed a 
drive towards a rule-based system with a strong, legalized and well-structured 
dispute settlement that placed retaliation at centre stage.14
 
The study highlights the use of retaliation as a trade remedy, its effectiveness and 
the perceived shortcomings. In relating to the above, the study examines in detail 
the use of the remedy by the Members, which is the developed, developing, and 
the least developed countries, bearing in mind the power imbalance and inequality 
thereof, which affects the ability of the Members in using the remedy differently. 
The study also explores the proposals of developing and least developed countries 
in attempting to improve retaliation as a remedy or having compensation as an 
alternative to retaliation. 
 
Arising from the findings of the study, it can be observed that much as the entire 
DSS improved greatly as compared to the GATT history, as well as the 
remarkable improvement in the utilization of retaliation as a remedy, a large 
majority of the Membership of the WTO, that is, the developing and least 
developed nations, are still unable to utilize retaliation as a remedy. The study 
reveals an appalling situation wherein great dissatisfaction of retaliation as a trade 
remedy is a trite fact; yet, there is reluctance by the WTO Members in finding 
mutually beneficial remedies for the entire Membership. However, from the 
 
14 Hudec R.E., .The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies, a Developing Country Perspective in  
    Development, Trade and the WTO, a handbook, 2002, p. 83 
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findings, there is a move by developing countries in attempting to advocate for the 
maximum use of the DSU by developing friendly remedies that are more viable 
than the current retaliation system. 
 
In carrying out the study, it was important to ascertain the term “Developing 
Country”, as the need to investigate how the remedy of retaliation affects such 
countries, was pertinent. Although the term “Developing Country” is often used 
in WTO agreements, the term is left undefined so that countries largely self-
designate their status, subject to challenge from another member.15 The term 
“Developing Countries” shall be used with the meaning imputed to it in the WTO 
Agreements and in this context shall cover economies ranging from those largely 
based on subsistence agriculture to those of Brazil and India, which have highly 
industrialized sectors that include commercial aircraft production and software. It 
is pertinent to note that in the WTO as well as in Public International Law, there 
is no precise definition of the term “Developing Country.16” The term herein shall 
be used to imply a relatively poor country, and it shall purposely refer to 
“Developing Countries” and “Least Developed Countries.” 
 
1.2  Background 
In determining the practicability of retaliation as a remedy, it was essential to look 
at the reasons why the WTO was established and one of its vital structures, the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. From the preamble of the Agreement 
establishing the WTO, it is recognized that it was set up for the following 
reasons:17
 
In their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor, the Parties 
recognized that conduct of the same should be with a view to raising standards of 
 
15 Shaffer Gregory, How to make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries:  
    Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies. Working Draft: Feb 14, 2003 at Pg. 32 
16 Horn H., & Mavroidis P.C., Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing  
    Countries. (WWW1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers, accessed on 23rd January 2007) 
17  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Paragraph 2  
     of the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
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living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services. 
 
In addition to the above, it is provided that the parties recognized the need for 
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the 
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development. Additionally, the 
parties were desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations whilst preserving the 
basic principles and furthering the objectives underlying the multilateral trading 
system.18  
 
It was equally vital to present the objectives of the DSU, a system where 
retaliation as a trade remedy is provided for.  The basic objectives governing 
dispute settlement under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures are 
embedded in article 3. Article 3 (1) is to the effect that Members adhere to the 
principles for the management of disputes applied under Articles XXII and XXIII 
of GATT 1947, whilst subsection 2 provides that the dispute settlement system of 
the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system, and that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements. 
According to Article 3(3), it is a vital objective of the dispute settlement system 
that the prompt settlement of disputes is achieved for the essential effective 
functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance between the 
rights and obligations of Members.  In addition to the above, it is provided that 
the recommendations or rulings made by the DSB are aimed at achieving a 
 
18 Ibid, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,     
    Paragraph 6. 
 7
                                                
satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations 
under the understanding and settlement of disputes.19
 
It is also provided that all solutions to matters formally raised under the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements, 
including arbitration awards, are to be consistent with those agreements and shall 
not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member, nor impede the attainment 
of any objective of the agreements.20
 
 Before bringing a case, a Member ought to exercise its judgment as to whether 
action under the DSS would be fruitful. Additionally, it is provided that the aim of 
the DSM is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.21 It is further provided that a 
solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the 
covered agreements is preferred and in the absence of a mutually agreed solution, 
the first objective of the DSM should be to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned.  The provision of compensation can only be resorted to as a temporary 
measure, and if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable. The 
last resort remedy provided for a Member invoking the DSU is suspending the 
application of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements, on 
a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the violating Member, after authorization by the 
DSB. It is further provided for that the involvement in dispute settlement 
procedures should be in good faith.22
 
It is against the above objectives of the WTO and the DSU, that the feasibility of 
retaliation as a remedy is measured. A feasible remedy for dispute settlement 
must not go against the above objectives; it must be a remedy to be applied in 
good faith for prompt resolution of disputes aimed at rebalancing the rights and 
obligations of the Members and promoting the principle of free trade, whilst 
 
19 Article 3 (4) of the DSU 
20 Article 3 (5) of the DSU 
21 Article 3 (7) of the DSU 
22 Article 3 (10) of the DSU 
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mindful of the development needs of the parties. The remedy provided must be 
one that satisfactorily settles the dispute between the parties, in accordance with 
their rights and obligations and must not nullify or impair them. 
 
1.2.1 The Basic Institutional Framework of the GATT/WTO 
 
It was found to be of great value to enunciate the basic institutional framework of 
the GATT/ WTO, as they form the constitutional governance of the WTO, 
without which the system cannot stand. These governing constitutional principles 
once breached prima facie entail the nullification and impairment of the rights of 
the WTO Members,23 which, once established by the DSB, entitles the 
complainant with the right to retaliate.  With the establishment of the GATT, the 
Parties agreed to a multilateral cooperative effort generally aimed at liberalizing 
trade through a series of tariff reductions. Four principles constitute the most 
important substantive obligations between Parties, though not exclusive.24  
 
The first core principle of the GATT system, set forth in article II, is that Parties 
will not charge a tariff for a particular product above the level agreed to and set 
forth in the tariff schedules.25 For clarity, tariffs themselves are legal, and Parties 
may charge whatever tariff they like for products not listed in the schedules. 
However, once a "tariff binding" has been negotiated for a particular product, 
Parties are bound to charge at or below that level. This simple obligation provides 
the institutional foundation for gradually trimming down artificial barriers to trade 
through negotiations and reciprocal commitments, the obligation is not open for 
renegotiation or broad interpretation, and the tariff schedules themselves provide 
a precise, detailed, and quantitative baseline for gauging compliance.  
 
A second principle, set forth in Article I, is the principle of the Most Favored 
Nation Treatment (MFN). This non-discrimination principle, which has long been 
 
23 Article 3(8)of the DSU 
24 Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 51,  
    2003, at Pg. 759 
25 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 
 9
a cornerstone of international trade law, requires that each Party grant to every 
other Party treatment with respect to any imports and exports no less favorable 
than it grants to any other nation. Thus, MFN ensures that any trading advantages 
given by one Party to another nation, whether a Party or not, will also be given to 
each Party. In essence, this principle "multilateralizes" the trade liberalization 
notion (at least with respect to obligations and negotiations) and provides a 
significant incentive for non-members to join. 
 
A third principle, set forth in Article III, is National Treatment on Internal 
Taxation and Regulation. This non-discrimination principle requires that with 
respect to internal taxation and regulatory measures, each Party treat imports from 
other Parties no less favorably than domestically produced goods.  
 
Finally, a fourth principle, set forth in Article XI, is that "No prohibitions or 
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or 
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of 
any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.  In essence, 
these latter two principles, along with a number of other GATT clauses limiting 
government actions affecting imports and exports, are aimed at restricting 
measures that could be substituted for tariffs as protectionist tools and at 
protecting the potential benefits of binding and then reducing tariffs. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Retaliation as a trade remedy has drawn so much controversy as being 
impracticable, especially regarding developing and least developed countries. The 
research problem is aimed at investigating the practicability of retaliation as a 
trade remedy. The notion of the remedy is raising tariff barriers against the 
violating Member. It is a known fact that once a country raises tariffs, the victims 
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to high tariffs are the consumers, due to the high prices of goods and services, 
which in turn raise standards of living. 
 
As seen in section 1.2, a positive resolution of disputes amongst Members is 
sought. However, with retaliation the dispute between the parties is 
unconstructively resolved, demonstrating a breakdown in negotiation between the 
parties. In addition to the above, in raising trade barriers against the offending 
Member, this not only deteriorates the trade between the parties, but also breaches 
the principle of good faith in dispute resolution.  
 
Retaliation as a remedy is not mindful of the development needs of developing 
and least developed countries and may retard their economies instead. Retaliation 
inhibits trade and does not promote the same and may lower the economic welfare 
of Members, the one that utilizes the remedy and the one it is applied against. The 
remedy may have repercussions that lead to loss of employment, a reduction in 
demand and in income and yet, it is still maintained as a remedy. Thus far, the 
Members of the WTO are yet to make bold steps in improving retaliation as a 
remedy, to be more development friendly.26
 
In spite of the reverse effects of retaliation and the fact that retaliation has always 
been a problem, as seen from the study of the GATT history, it is still retained as 
the last resort trade remedy.27 In addition to that, the remedy as applied does not 
take into account the economic power imbalance among the parties, and due to 
the inability of developing and least developed countries in utilizing the remedy, 
they are left without a last resort trade remedy when a party failures to comply 
with the recommendations of the DSB or fails to pay compensation. 
 
 
26 The basic trade theory of Smith & Ricardo are in favour of abolishing retaliation altogether, as noted by  
    Holger Spamann, The Myth of “Rebalancing” Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice, Journal  
    of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, at Pg. 8 
27 Article 3 (7) of the DSU 
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1.4 Objectives of the study 
The main aim of the research was to determine the viability of retaliation as a 
trade remedy under the DSU; it was to establish whether retaliation as a remedy is 
beneficial to the entire WTO membership and system. The specific objectives 
were: 
1.4.1 To examine the feasibility of damages as an alternative remedy to retaliation 
1.4.2 To determine whether there is need to revise the DSU, for it to adopt a more 
development friendly approach to dispute resolution. 
1.4.3 To make recommendations regarding the improvement of the dispute settlement  
Understanding 
 
1.5 Hypothesis  
1.5.1 WTO Members are not committed to binding obligations, and that is why 
retaliation is still maintained as a last resort remedy in spite of the inability of 
developing and least developed nations in using it. 
1.5.2 It is not credibly established whether there are methods for improving retaliation 
as a remedy.  
1.5.3 An argument for Damages/ Compensation may not be a viable alternative for 
retaliation. 
 
1.6  Scope of the Study 
The study focused on retaliation as a remedy under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, the conceptual remedy of retaliation as envisaged in the early 
GATT and the WTO, its efficacy and usefulness in the current system and the 
perceived shortcomings. 
 
The study covered an investigation as to how and when the right to retaliate 
arises, that is, the prerequisite procedure for a party instituting a complaint, the 
requisite recommendations of the panel, and the compliance, or non-compliance 
thereof, entitling one to retaliation as a remedy in violation complaints. The study 
explored the use of retaliation by the developing countries. In addition to the 
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above, the study also covered the argument for damages in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, above retaliation. The study highlighted the efficacy of retaliation 
to Third Party Members in the Dispute Settlement. 
 
1.7  Significance of the Research 
It is vital for a system that seeks to monitor and safeguard the trading concessions, 
to be credible before its members. Retaliation as a trade remedy according to 
article 3.7 of the DSU was designed to perform the rebalancing effect of an 
impaired member’s concessions. It does defeat the purpose of the remedy and the 
entire dispute resolution system if the remedy is professed to have reverse effects. 
As noted by Jeff Waincymer28, it is generally assumed that trade retaliation under 
the WTO performs a “rebalancing” by allowing the injured member to suspend 
‘concessions and obligations’ against the violating member of a level equivalent 
to that of ‘nullification and impairment’ suffered by the injured member. This 
research is important in establishing the reliability of the above perception.   
 
The study of the feasibility of retaliation as a trade remedy is vital in analyzing 
whether there is another mechanism for improving retaliation as a trade remedy. 
The findings and recommendations will aide in establishing whether there are 
more feasible remedies preferred to retaliation. 
 
The study is a contribution to the body of knowledge as regards the feasibility of 
retaliation as a trade remedy. It will be constructive to not only scholars, but also 
the entire public. Nonetheless, the study triggers off the need for additional and 
continuous research in related areas.  
 
1.8 Key words 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade organization 
(WTO), Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), Dispute Settlement Body, Ex- 
nunc termination, Most Favored Nation, Retaliation, Nullification, Damages, 
 
28 Waincymer Jeff. , WTO Litigation, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 12 at Pg. 95 
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Remedies, Impairment, Multilateral Trade, Developing Countries, Developed 
Countries, Ultima- ratio, inadimplenti non est adimplendum, clausula rebus sic 
stantibus, Pacta Sunt Servanda, Good Faith. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the methodology that was used in the study and specifically 
highlights the research design, study sample, research instruments, data collection 
and analysis and limitations to the study. 
 
2.2 Research Design 
The research design was based on a literature study in which various factors that 
affect the reliability and effectiveness of retaliation as a trade remedy were 
examined. The research design foremost, involved examining the historical 
background and origins of the institutions that is, the GATT and the WTO that 
administer the trade remedy of retaliation, as well as their institutional framework. 
 
The research design included reviewing the entire process of commencement of 
proceedings of dispute resolution up to the stage where retaliation is authorized. 
The type of study that was carried out was largely qualitative. 
 
Identification and clarification of variables that seemed to have an impediment to 
the effectiveness of retaliation as a trade remedy, was done.  Qualitative data was 
collected through self-administered questionnaires and documentary sources. The 
unit of analysis was the individual respondents. However, heavy reliance upon 
documentary evidence was made. The findings were generalized and constituted 
the basis upon which recommendations were made. 
 
The analysis involved identification of the objectives of the Agreement 
establishing the WTO, and also the objectives for the Dispute Settlement System. 
The relevance of identifying the objectives of the Agreement establishing the 
WTO was to enable the ascertainment of what the contracting Parties intended to 
achieve. The identification of the objectives of the Dispute Settlement System was 
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also to ascertain what the dispute system was intended to achieve. The identified 
objectives respectively, were then matched against the objectives of the trade 
remedy of retaliation in investigating its feasibility. Additionally, it was important 
in carrying out the study to establish whether the WTO system protects interests 
of all Contracting Members, bearing in mind the power imbalance among them. 
 
2.3 Area of Study 
The study covered the review of retaliation as a trade remedy. It was vital not to 
have isolated the study of the remedy from the entire dispute settlement 
mechanism and as a result, the entire system of dispute settlement was 
highlighted. This was done; reason being that, the reader without knowledge 
regarding the operation of the Dispute Settlement System would be equipped with 
the overall structure of dispute settlement.  
 
As background study, it was important to study the institutional framework of the 
trading system of the World Trade Organization. It is vital to stress herein that the 
institutional framework highlights the backbone of the essence of the World 
trading system, which bears down to the very foundation of the system and 
agreement between the members. This institutional framework and obligations if 
not respected, lead to the instigation and commencement of dispute resolution 
proceedings for eventual determination of the retaliatory right. 
 
In line with the above, it was only appropriate that the study cover the underlying 
essence of the remedy of retaliation and its main objective of “rebalancing of 
concessions” in determination of its efficacy.  An investigation of other perceived 
‘suitable’ remedy, which is ‘Compensation’, was carried out, exploring the 
suggestions for its viability as a remedy. 
 
It was pertinent to give an overview of the origins of the administrative 
framework of the remedy of retaliation and as a result, the history and evolution 
of a World Trading System, the “GATT” as the parent organization was studied. 
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2.4 Study Population  
The study population comprised scholars at different levels, some at a masters’ 
level, and others at PHD.  Practitioners of law were also involved, though limited. 
However, the study population also constituted public servants from the Ugandan 
government departments, which in this case are; Ministry of Finance, Planning 
and Economic Development, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. 
 
In addition to the above, the study population also included respondents from the 
Uganda Private Sector and the public. Regarding respondents from the private 
sector and government departments; these were officials who are involved in 
trade matters, not only at the national level, but also at the international level. 
 
2.5 Study Sample 
The purposeful sampling technique was used to identify respondents, in obtaining 
data. Therefore, target respondents well familiar with the area of study were 
approached with the questionnaire for purposes of carrying out this research. As a 
result, specific respondents were selected to complete the self-administered 
questionnaire, after specifically establishing knowledge of the respondent in the 
subject area of study. 
 
The targeted number of respondents was 80. Four Ministries in Uganda were 
purposefully selected, wherein questionnaires were administered. These relevant 
Ministries are, Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI), Ministry of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MOJCA), Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
(MOFPED). The respondents in the said ministries are designated desk officers 
who handle trade matters on behalf of their ministries, whilst others were Officers 
conversant with the area of study. 
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In MTTI, it was established that there were ten trade officials and the 
questionnaire was distributed to all the ten officials, where six responses were 
obtained. In MOFA, there were five established respondents, and only two 
responses were obtained, whilst in MOJCA, there were five established 
respondents, and only three responses were obtained. In MOFPED, there were 
four established responses, and all the four responded. The remaining twenty-six, 
(26) targeted respondents in Uganda were from the Private Sector and the general 
public, wherein only thirteen (13) responses were obtained. The remaining 30 
target respondents were administered questionnaires via email, wherein 18 
responses were obtained. 
 
2.6 Research Instruments 
A research instrument in the form of a questionnaire was designed to facilitate 
data collection. This questionnaire was administered to a variety of government 
officials in key positions, dealing with trade related matters and specifically 
conversant with the area of research. These officials are placed in different 
ministries, in managerial and administrative positions. The respondents 
approached in government were the contact persons in matters of trade, 
representing the specific government ministries, not only at the national but also 
at the international forum. This specified sample would provide an increased 
likelihood for identification of both administrative and logistic issues that affect 
the implementation of retaliation as a trade remedy. 
 
The questionnaire was also administered upon scholarly respondents. The choice 
of these respondents was based upon the fact that they were up to date with the 
knowledge and current status of the area of study. This section of respondents 
would particularly be highlighting/underpinning the debate regarding the 
suitability of retaliation as a trade remedy and providing an insight into what the 
scholars suggest/ recommend as being more feasible remedies. The use of 
questionnaires also made it possible to collect data from a wide variety of 
respondents. 
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In order to ascertain the validity and reliability of the instruments, the 
questionnaires were pre-tested on some respondents and some adjustments were 
made before application to the rest of the respondents, attached as annex 1.  
  
The questionnaire was used for data collection for purposes of enabling the 
respondents to fill in the questionnaire according to their level of knowledge and 
understanding of the study area in issue and without being aided. 
 
2.7 Data Collection   
Primary data was collected through self administered questionnaires and 
observations. Several visits to the various respondents were made before they 
could complete the questionnaires, these visits ranged from 1- 4 visits. Out of a 
total of 50 respondents in Uganda and hence accounting for a distributed total of 
50 questionnaires, only twenty-eight responses were obtained. The failure to 
obtain the remaining twenty-two responses was explained by either the 
unavailability of the respondents once the questionnaire had been administered, 
whilst others were unexplained.  
 
The remaining 30 questionnaires were administered via email, electronically. The 
reason for this was not being within the same geographical setting with the 
relevant respondents. Out of the total of 30 questionnaires that were distributed, 
only eighteen responses were obtained. The respondents both via email and the 
Ugandan respondents were given the same amount of time to respond to the 
questionnaire, that is, one month. A follow-up to aide the completion of the 
questionnaires online was made via email. 
 
Secondary data was obtained through the study of various documents in the 
category of textbooks, journals, reports and laws; which were extremely vital as 
sources of information. Qualitative data was obtained through the above data 
collection methods. 
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2.8 Data Analysis  
Data from the self-administered questionnaires was coded and frequencies 
regarding various variables obtained. Content analysis was applied in analyzing 
data from the self-administered questionnaires and observations. The analysis was 
interpreted and formed the basis for the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
2.9 Limitations to the Study 
The most hindering limitation faced was the narrow base of respondents. It is 
unsatisfactory to note how little society knows about the World Trade 
Organization, let alone the Dispute Settlement System. It was only persons who 
have specifically studied International Trade Law that knew about the operation 
of the WTO and the DSU. It was even more appalling to note that fully learned 
lawyers, including senior government officials do not know what the WTO stands 
for. 
 
The other limitation to the study was in data collection, given the fact that 
retaliation as a trade remedy is for the entire World Trade Organization 
Membership, in order to carry out a more viable research that would give a 
wholesome representation of the research findings, it would have been very 
important to administer the questionnaire to the wide Membership of the WTO. 
 
The fact that people did not readily respond to the questionnaire was another 
limitation to the study, since several visits had to be made to obtain the 
questionnaires.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN GATT AND THE WTO 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The essence of giving the GATT history is to show the gradual improvement in 
legal enforcement and to acquire a wholesome picture of the dispute settlement 
system from whence the legal remedy of retaliation emanates, to show the 
historical institutional strengths and weaknesses of the system that essentially 
administers the remedy of retaliation and ultimately to show how the 
GATT/WTO regime has evolved with respect to substantive obligations, 
principles, commitments, and compliance of the same. The study of these origins 
is relevant because the decisions, procedures and customary practices of the 
GATT guide the WTO in its actions.29
 
3.2  Origins of the GATT 
The origins of the GATT as both the “Constitution of International Trade Law” 
and the dominant Multilateral International Trade Institution lie in the disastrous 
experience with protectionism in the 1930’s. The history of the GATT begins in 
1945 when the United States (U.S) invited its wartime allies to enter into 
negotiations to conclude a multilateral agreement for the reciprocal reduction of 
tariffs on trade in goods. At the proposal of the U.S, the United Nations’ 
Economic and Social Committee adopted a resolution in 1946, calling for a 
conference to draft a charter for an “International Trade Organization.30” The 
major initiatives leading to the establishment of the GATT were taken by the US 
during World War II, in cooperation with its allies. It is argued that the mistakes 
made concerning economic policy during the interwar period (1920- 1940) were a 
major cause of the disasters that led to World War II. In the interwar period, many 
 
29 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article 16 (1) 
30 1 UN ECOSOC Res. 13, UN Doc. E/22, 1946, See also Van Den Bossche P., The Law and Policy of The  
    World Trade Organisation, Text, Cases & Materials, Maastricht University, Cambridge University Press,  
    2005 at Pg. 79 
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other nations began enacting protectionist measures, including quota- type 
restrictions, which chocked off international trade.31  
 
This made political leaders envision the idea of creating post war economic 
institutions that would prevent these mistakes from happening again. Ironically, 
GATT Article XXIX makes clear that GATT was intended only as a provisional 
legal instrument.32 The principal and enduring agreement was to be the Havana 
Charter, which established the International Trade Organization negotiations, 
wherein Members decided that there ought to be multilateral negotiations to cut 
tariffs. About 23 countries agreed and participated in the negotiations, which were 
completed in August 1947. It was assumed that the written product of the tariff 
reduction negotiations, the GATT, would be a temporary document, and that the 
exemptions from its disciplines for pre-existing legislation and preference 
schemes would terminate, once the Havana Charter entered into force.33  
 
The two-track strategy was doomed when the U.S president Truman 
administration announced that it would not pursue congressional approval for the 
Havana Charter. What remained was GATT, the ostensibly temporary document 
narrowly aimed at slashing tariffs and the minimalist institutional framework 
created by that supposedly provisional document. On the 30th October 1947, the 
U.S and the other original contracting parties approved the GATT on a 
provisional basis, and it was christened with the formal name of the “Protocol of 
Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.” It 
entered into force on 1st January 1948. For almost the next half century, until the 
WTO was established on 1st January 1995, GATT filled imperfectly the void 
 
31 Jackson John. H., The World Trading System, Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, The  
    MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2nd Ed, 1998 at Pg. 36   See also  
    Waincymer Jeff, WTO Litigation, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 12 at Pg. 43 
32 Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, 2nd Ed, Lexis Publishing, Lexis- Nexis,  
    Martindale- Hubbell, 2001 at Pg. 127 See also Waincymer Jeff, WTO Litigation, Op. Cit, Supra,  
    footnote 12 at Pg. 44  Note, Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO  
    Dispute Settlement System, Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 14/ spring 2003, at Pg. 5 
33 Jackson John H., The World Trading System, OP. Cit, Supra footnote 31, at Pg. 39, (The Protocol of  
    Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade) 
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created by the rejection of the ITO. To date, GATT remains the most important 
legal document in all of International Trade Law.34  
 
It is documented that during the 1960’s, the GATT dispute settlement procedure 
fell into disuse.35 Developing countries pushed through a proposal in GATT 
designed to strengthen the dispute settlement procedures. In a celebrated exercise, 
Uruguay brought a series of complaints against industrial countries’ treatment of 
Uruguayan exports.36 It was during this 1962 case that the notion of “Prima facie 
nullification and impairment” which is being used to date, developed.37 The 
central and formal procedures for dispute settlement were found in Articles XXII 
and XXIII.38 The latter article was the centerpiece for dispute settlement in GATT 
and is still relevant to the WTO procedures.  
 
Three main features of the GATT dispute settlement system can be stressed; it 
was always invoked on the grounds of ‘nullification or impairment’ of benefits 
expected under the agreement, and did not depend on actual breach of legal 
obligations.39 Secondly, they established the power for the contracting parties not 
only to investigate and recommend action but to give a ruling on the matter and 
thirdly, they gave the contracting parties the power in appropriately serious cases 
to authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend GATT obligations to other 
contracting parties in default of their GATT obligations.  
 
Due to the deficiencies in the GATT Dispute Settlement System (DSS), the 
Uruguay Round dispute settlement understanding was later adopted, wherein 
governments agreed to replace parts of the GATT dispute settlement procedure, 
under which the defendant Member had a right to sanction both the adoption of 
legal rulings (the act that made them legally binding) and the authorization of 
 
34 Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32 at Pg. 127 
35 Ibid, at Pg. 197 
36 GATT, BISD 11 Supp. 18 (1967) 
37 Jackson John H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra footnote 31, at Pg. 114  
38 Waincymer Jeff. , WTO Litigation, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 12, at Pg. 83 
39 Jackson John H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra footnote 31 at Pg. 115 
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retaliation in case of non-compliance. In their place, the new WTO procedure 
made legal rulings legally binding automatically and made retaliation 
involuntarily available in the event of non -compliance. The fact that governments 
adopted the changes, showed that governments were in fact, ready to make a 
significantly stronger commitment to enforcement of WTO legal obligations. 
 
During the 1986- 1994 Uruguay round negotiations, GATT governments initially 
decided to settle for some minor procedural improvements in the GATT disputes 
procedure. The decision was made in December 1988, as part of an “early 
harvest” of negotiating results.40 However, governments declined to abridge the 
consensus principle that gave the loosing party the opportunity to veto power over 
legal rulings and retaliation remedies.  
 
The attitude at the time was that dispute settlement would work better on the 
whole if Members participated on a voluntary basis and that it would not be 
productive to try to force governments into adjudicatory rulings they were not 
prepared to accept willingly. It is argued that what led to the crack of the 
resistance to enforce GATT legal enforcement was the infamous section 301 law 
in the U.S, a law that called for the imposition of unilateral trade sanctions against 
other GATT Members whenever the US government determined that they were in 
violation of their GATT obligations, or, were behaving in an otherwise 
unreasonable manner toward US trade. The other Members of GATT viewed the 
new legislation as extremely threatening, and called a special session of the 
GATT Council to demand a change of US policy.41
 
What was evident in earlier GATT history was the lack of political commitments 
Members made to GATT Law. The very evident drawback was the fact that the 
 
40 Hudec Robert E., Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement at Pg. 5, available at:  
    http: www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf, accessed on 3rd January 2007  
41 GATT Doc. C/163 (16) March 1989. The US justification for its resort to unilateral action was the 
complaint that the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures were too slow, and too weak, to offer adequate 
protection of US trade interests. In exchange for a U.S commitment to adjudicate all WTO based section 
301 complaints under the WTO system, the other GATT parties agreed to create a new and procedurally 
tighter DSS that would meet U.S complaints. 
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entire legal performance took place in a setting in which the leading governments 
had retained the legal authority not to obey GATT law. GATT law was never 
given direct effect in their domestic laws.42 It is worthy noting the fact that 
Members wanted the freedom to disobey, was a fallible point from which the 
GATT legal system had to built. Hudec gives several aspects of vital legal failures 
of the GATT system.43  In September 1986, in Punta Del Este, Uruguay, a large 
ministerial meeting was held to launch a new trade round, called the “Uruguay 
Round.44 Among the issues to be discussed, focus was to be on the dispute 
settlement rules, given that the GATT rules were defective.  
 
After several years of negotiating, the settlement, which was reached in 1993, 
included the draft charter (as well as various other texts) for a World Trade 
Organization that was finally brought into existence. This draft was signed at a 
ministerial meeting in Marrakech, Morocco, on 15th April 1995.45 The results of 
the Uruguay round do not supplant, but rather supplement the original GATT 
document and legal instruments under it that were operative before the entry into 
force of the WTO Agreement.46  
 
3.3 Weaknesses in the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures 
To appreciate the inherent frailties the Uruguay round negotiators needed to fix, it 
is necessary to understand the textual basis for those frailties, that is, GATT 
Articles XXII and XXIII. Article XXII calls upon each contracting party to accord 
‘sympathetic consideration’ to and consult with other contracting parties, article 
 
42 Hudec Robert E., Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, available at: 
www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/humedremedies.pdf at Pg.3, accessed on 3rd January 2007 
43 See Ibid, Hudec at pg. 3 ((a) The story of the collapse of legal discipline over agriculture in the 1950’s,  
   (b) The withdrawal of textiles and apparel from GATT legal discipline in the late 1950s’, (c) The removal  
   of legal discipline over U.S. petroleum trade at about the same time, (d) The accommodation of  
   “Residual” balance of payments restrictions when the balance of payments justification ended in the early  
   1960s’, (e) The withdrawal of the Treaty of Rome from effective legal review during the 1960s’, (f) The  
   Withdrawal of export financing from GATT supervision through deference to the rules of OECD club  
   and (g) the rise of largely unregulated anti-dumping measures as a new form of protection.) 
44 Jackson John H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 31, at Pg. 44 
45 Jackson John H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 31, at Pg.46  
46 GATT 1994 S. 1 (a) provides that “GATT 1994” includes “GATT 1947”. Hence, by definition, reference 
to ‘GATT 1994’ includes ‘GATT 1947’ 
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XXIII establishes a skeletal framework for handling cases where one contracting 
party believes another Member is acting at variance with GATT obligations, 
technically known as ‘violation, nullification and impairment,’ or otherwise 
behaving in a way that denies benefits that should be available, technically known 
as ‘non- violation, nullification and impairment.’ The distinction between 
violation and non-violations nullification and impairment must be maintained, 
because it is unique. The concept of violation is when a Contracting Party fails to 
carry out its obligations under the Agreement,47whereas non-violations 
nullification and impairment occur when the application by another Contracting 
Party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of the 
Agreement, still nullify or impair the rights of another.48   In the pre- Uruguay 
round era, GATT articles XXII- XXIII were criticized as insufficiently precise 
and, therefore, ineffective. Such criticisms were a major impetus behind the 
Uruguay round negotiations and specifically, the WTO Agreement and the 
DSU.49
  
Hudec compares the earlier GATT dispute settlement success stories that were 
essentially diplomatic, as having been akin to walking on eggshells.50 The GATT 
DSS reflected a ‘pragmatic’ approach to multilateral dispute resolution, as distinct 
from a ‘legalistic’ one. The pre- DSU system was a European- style conciliatory 
one. The emphasis was on negotiation and diplomacy. The implicit assumption in 
the negotiation/ diplomacy approach was that contracting parties would act nobly 
towards one another, this proved wrong as the contracting parties started playing 
power games that added to trade friction rather than leading to mutually 
acceptable, balanced solutions. A more rigorous system was feared as being law 
creating and thus threatening the sovereignty of Members.  
 
 
47 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994, Article 23 (1) a 
48 Ibid, Article 23 (1) b 
49 Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32 at Pg.196 
50 Hudec Robert. E., Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, Op. Cit, Supra,  
    footnote 42, at Pg.2  
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The GATT dispute settlement process and remedies were the same as the ones 
under the WTO, with the exception that under GATT, the procedural steps were 
riddled with problems that rendered the entire system insufferably weak, such 
problems included blockage of the dispute settlement process at any given stage 
of the proceedings. There were no time periods for the various steps; any step 
could go on incessantly, accordingly, cases could go on for years.51
 
The Uruguay round for the first time established an overall unified dispute 
settlement system for all portions of its agreements, and provides a legal text 
(rather than just customary practice) to carry out its procedures. These new 
procedures include measures to avoid ‘blocking’, which occurred under previous 
consensus decision-making rules. We now have the WTO as the principal 
institution for international trade, and to understand this institution, it was vital to 
understand its predecessor, the GATT. The WTO charter “guidance” clause 
makes it clear that the GATT history is significant; prescribing in Article 16 that 
the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices of 
the GATT, making the history of the GATT a vital element for the interpretation 
and understanding of the WTO Institutions and other provisions.52
 
3.4 Retaliation under GATT 
Although retaliation was permissible, rebalancing of concessions remained the 
dominant solution during the GATT years. In fact no GATT-authorized 
retaliatory action was taken during its 47-year history.53 Developing countries’ 
lawsuits had no real force because they simply did not have the market power to 
injure a developed country by retaliation.54 Authorization to retaliate in the event 
 
51 As noted by Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice. Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32, at Pg.  
    199.  Also noted by Hudec Robert E., Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement,  
    Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 42 at Pg. 8, The Superfund Case, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain  
    Imported Substances, GATT, BISD, 34th Supp. (1988) 
52 Jackson John. H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 31 at Pg. 31. See also Van Den  
    Bossche P., The Law and Policy of The World Trade Organisation, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 30, at Pg. 78 
53 Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32, 
    at Pg. 5 
54 Hudec R.E., Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Trade Policy Research Center, 1987,  
    Pg.48 
Deleted:  
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of non-compliance could be blocked, blockage was possible because under pre- 
Uruguay round rules, consensus among the contracting parties was needed to 
agree to form a panel or adopt a report, and ‘Consensus’ meant unanimity.  
 
If there was an objection from one contracting party, the action was blocked. To 
those seeking to advance international rule of law, this situation was ludicrous.55 
Remedial action to enforce compliance was virtually impossible. The only way a 
winning party could, consistent with its GATT obligations, retaliate was to obtain 
the approval of the contracting parties. However, their approval required a 
consensus, and once again, that could be blocked by just one contracting party, 
the loosing one. Not surprisingly, in only one pre- Uruguay round case did the 
contracting parties sanction retaliation.56 The Members were authorized by 
majority vote to suspend concessions by way of retaliation, or rebalancing of 
benefits.  
 
In line with the preceding paragraph, the complaining government could at some 
point request authorization to retaliate by imposing approximately equal trade 
barriers in return, but the defendant would inevitably veto the request. In modern 
GATT practice, only two requests of retaliation authorization were made, both 
against the US, and both were vetoed.57 Both requests came in the superfund case, 
United States; Taxes on petroleum and certain imported substances.58 Despite the 
developed Members’ ability to block the procedures, the GATT dispute 
settlement procedures produced a considerable number of dispute settlement 
complaints during its almost 50 years’ history. GATT cases from 1948 to the end 
of 1989, counted to 207 cases, with 88 (Eighty eight) produced legal rulings. Of 
the Eighty-eight, 68 (Sixty Eight) were rulings of violation.59  
 
55 Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32 at Pg. 200 
56 Dairy Products from Holland, BISD, Vol. II (1952) 116 
57 Hudec Robert E., The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing Country  
    Perspective, (Development, Trade and the WTO), A Handbook, Hoekman Bernard, Aaditya Mattoo and  
    Philip English, The World Bank 2002, at Pg. 82 
58 GATT, BISD 34th Supp. 136-66 (1988) 
59 Hudec Robert E., The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 57 at  
    Pg. 82 
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In the decade of the 1980s, when the GATT system had matured, there were 115 
(One Hundred and fifteen) complaints yielding 47 (Forty seven) legal rulings, of 
which 40 (Forty) were rulings of legal violation. The GATT had 71 (Seventy one) 
more complaints in the final five years of GATT operations (1990 – 1994), with 
22 (twenty two) legal rulings, twenty of which were rulings of legal violation. In 
its 1st three decades, the GATT system achieved almost a 100% success rate in 
producing a satisfactory response to legal rulings.60  
 
Over the GATT’s entire history, 28 (Twenty Eight) complaints were brought by 
developing countries, of which 17 (Seventeen) ended in legal rulings, 11 (Eleven) 
of which were rulings of legal violation, and 10 of the 11 (91%) had a successful 
outcome.61 Of the 22 complaints known to be based on a valid legal claim, 
satisfaction was achieved in 18 of the cases (82%) even in the more contentious 
cases of the 1980s, legally valid complaints by developing countries achieved a 
73% success rate.62   
 
The paradoxical contrast between the voluntary procedures and weak remedies of 
the GATT DSS on the one hand, and its rather strong record of success, on the 
other, contains a lesson. It teaches that the enforcement of international legal 
obligations cannot be explained by superficial analysis of dispute settlement 
procedures and remedies. Enforcement requires that member parties be persuaded 
to reverse decisions they have taken in violation of the agreement.  
 
Clair Wilcox, the Vice- Chairman of the U.S delegation to the Havana Conference 
noted that the possibility of suspending trade concessions under the GATT was to 
be regarded as a method of restoring a balance of benefits and obligations that, for 
any reason, may have been disturbed. He further stated that it was nowhere to be 
described as a penalty to be imposed on Members that would violate their 
obligations or as a sanction to ensure that the obligations of Members would be 
 
60 Ibid, at Pg. 82 
61 Ibid, at Pg. 82 
62 Ibid, at Pg. 82  
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observed. He further averred that, even so regarded, retaliation would not operate 
as a sanction and a penalty.63  
 
 Before conclusion of the WTO Agreements, the main standard for the 
permissible level of suspension (rebalancing of concessions) was GATT Article 
XXIII.2, which used the looser criterion of ‘appropriate’ suspension. The GATT 
1947 used the criterion of ‘substantially equivalent’ only to prescribe the 
permissible level of compensatory withdrawals/suspension, in reaction to GATT-
inconsistent tariff schedule modifications (Articles XVIII.7 (b)/21, 
XXVIII.3/4(d)) or safeguards (Article XIX.3 (a)) of another contracting party. 
While the criterion of ‘appropriate’ was often brought into proximity of 
‘substantially equivalent’ by GATT players, the former was clearly significantly 
more open than the latter, and this distinction was affirmed by the Legal Advisor 
to the Director-General and the Deputy Director-General in GATT Council 
meetings as recently as 1988, during the Uruguay Round negotiations.64 The DSU 
negotiators’ choice of the equivalence standard in DSU Article 22 (4) must hence 
have been a conscious one. 
 
Auspiciously, at the end of the Uruguay round, a more sound DSU was reached 
that dealt away with the weaknesses of the GATT DSU. The current DSU 
contains tight deadlines for virtually every stage of the dispute resolution process, 
and disputes generally are resolved within one year. Blockage of adoption of 
panel or Appellate Body reports is impossible. The loosing party must notify the 
DSB how it intends to comply with the recommendations. Failure to comply 
triggers remedial action, blockage of authorization to retaliate is impossible. In 
brief, there is “automaticity” and there are ‘teeth’ built into the DSU.65  
 
 
 
63 Jackson John. H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 31 at Pg. 113 
64 Holger Spamann, The Myth of “Rebalancing” Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice, Journal  
   of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, at Pg. 5. See GATT Document C/M/220  
   (Meeting of 8th April 1988), at Pg. 35 
65 Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32 at Pg. 221 
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3.5 Historical Overview of a Demand for Compensation under GATT 
Under GATT, an injured party was not authorized to seek compensation for past 
harms or to implement punitive measures.66 During the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, certain developing countries underlined the importance of 
compensation in the event of a developed country violating their GATT 
obligations to the detriment of developing countries.67 Compensating policies are 
seen to be welfare enhancing; as compensation lowers trade barriers, which 
benefits domestic consumers and foreign exporters, it fosters international 
competition whilst ensuring global resource allocation and drives innovation. 
Also, compensating trade partners for the damage inflicted upon them is 
considered a fair measure.68
 
The most obvious and prevalent reason offered by scholars to explain why the 
GATT system did not expressly authorize retroactively compensatory or punitive 
measures (or evolve in a manner that authorized such measures) is rooted in 
sovereignty concerns and the view that the GATT dispute settlement system was 
primarily a political institution rather than a judicial one. This view is 
undoubtedly accurate, but it is not complete.69 Another reason advanced is that 
disputes generally did not concern intentional non-compliance, which would 
warrant such measures from the perspective of deterrence, but rather concerned 
either real disputes over the scope and interpretation of the rules or capacity 
problems, either of which would not warrant such measures from the perspective 
of deterrence because non-compliance would not be the result of a party’s lack of 
intent to comply.70
 
 
66 Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 51,  
     2003, at Pg. 766 
67 Kofi Oteng Kufuor, International Trade, from the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the  
    Reform of the Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes. Journal of World Trade,  
    ISSN 1011-6702, 1997, 31 (5) 117- 145, at Pg. 139 
68 Hudec Robert E., Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, Op. Cit, Supra,  
    footnote 42 at Pg. 16 
69 Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 66  
    at Pg. 770 
70  Ibid, at Pg. 769 
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To the extent that disputes between parties did not originate from intentional non-
compliance but rather from an actual dispute over the rules or obligations, or from 
a capacity problem, the process would provide significant benefits to the 
disputants as well as the GATT regime as a whole. The fact that the settlement 
rate prior to a panel ruling was high and that the losing party eventually adopted 
most panel reports, provides support for this conclusion. 
 
Brazil in 1965 during the Uruguay Round proposed a reform of Article XXIII of 
the GATT, and the proposals were to the effect that:  
(I) A financial compensation on mutually acceptable terms to be paid in case of 
violations of the GATT by developed countries where it was established that the 
measure at hand had adverse effects on the trade of the developing country.71  
(II) The possibility for developing countries to be released from their obligations 
under the GATT towards a developed country whose restrictive measures were 
found to have impaired their import capacity. 
(III) If a developed country was not found to have complied with a panel 
recommendation within a certain time limit, the possibility of a collective action 
in order to obtain compliance would be provided for.72
 
It is worthy noting that the Brazil and Uruguay proposed reforms73 did not aim at 
improving the overall GATT dispute settlement system, but at establishing a 
preferential treatment within the system to favor developing countries. This 
reform aspired to alleviate the unequal economic relationship between North & 
South, which was felt to be reflected in the GATT DSS functioning. 
 
 
71 Gupta K.R., GATT and Underdeveloped Countries, Atma, Ram & Sons, 1976, at Pg. 273 
72  Ibid, at Pg. 273 
73 Proposals that: (1) Particular attention to be given regarding Differential and more Favourable Treatment 
for developing countries, (2) Special Consideration must be ascribed to the difficulties faced by developing 
Contracting Parties seeking equitable solutions in disputes with more powerful Contracting Parties, (3) In 
the light of the Punta Del Este Declaration, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism could be improved with a 
view to introducing a higher level of equity and thereby protecting Contracting Parties which can only 
count upon limited power of retaliation. See MTN.GNG/NG13/W/24,Pg. 1 accessed on 3rd January 2007 at: 
www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/urdsu.htm   
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In demanding compensation, a major concern was to create new remedies in favor 
of developing countries in order to balance their inability to retaliate against 
developed Members. Financial compensation was seen to be the best option.74 
This proposal was rejected on the ground that, granting the aggrieved party a right 
to financial compensation would undermine the defendant Member’s 
sovereignty.75 The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on legal amendments also 
shows that the possibility of a financial compensation was rejected on the ground 
that “it would be impossible to evaluate the loss occasioned by a contracting party 
in its export opportunities in money terms.76”  
 
In addition, the right for developing countries to be released from their obligations 
under certain circumstances was considered excessive.77 Though the above 
proposals were rejected, they had a certain legislative impact in the form of the 
inclusion of part IV in the GATT and the adoption of the 1966 procedures. When 
the Brazil & Uruguay proposals were put forward, the GATT DSM merely 
consisted of the “Consultation” and the “nullification or impairment” provisions. 
The first attempt in taking account of developing countries’ particular position as 
to the GATT DSM was the inclusion of part IV.78 Although these articles are not 
directly related to the dispute settlement, their inclusion was mainly designed to 
encourage collaboration between the developed and less developed contracting 
countries in order to foster development, (Article XXXVII (2)). The inclusion of 
part IV constituted a 1st step though towards the recognition of a special status for 
developing countries in the GATT disputes settlement mechanism.79   
 
 
 
74 Kofi Oteng Kufuor, International Trade, from the GATT to the WTO, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 67 at Pg.  
    123 
75 Taxil, B., L’ OMC et les pays en developpement. Montchrestien, 1998, P.133  
76 Gupta, GATT and Underdeveloped Countries, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 71at Pg. 273 
77 Taxil B., B., L’ OMC et les pays en developpement. Montchrestien, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 50 at Pg.  
    133 
78 Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 3 (12), Annex P.18 (Trade & Development) which added to  
    The GATT Agreement Articles XXXVI, XXXVII & XXXVIII (See Kuruvila, P.E, International Trade,  
    Developing Countries and the GATT/ WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, Journal of World Trade,  
    ISSN 1011-6702, 1997, 31 (6), 171-208, at Pg.172) 
79 Kuruvila, P.E, International Trade, Developing Countries and the GATT/ WTO Dispute Settlement  
    Mechanism, Journal of World Trade, ISSN 1011-6702, 1997, 31 (6), 171-208, at Pg. 172 & 191 
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It must be noted that as a result of the 1966 procedures, the inclusion of this 
proviso was added; that the Panel  “take due account of all the circumstances and 
considerations relating to the application of measures complained of and their 
impact on the trade and economic development of affected contracting parties."80 
This provision was designed to call upon panels to take into account the economic 
dimension of the case, besides its purely legal implications. The new rule 
represented a political and legal recognition of the unequal economic relationship 
between developed and underdeveloped countries. 
 
It follows then from the above provision that panels cannot rule on a restrictive 
measure or practice applied by an industrialized country in a purely legalistic 
way. Such a restrictive measure is more likely to affect developing countries than 
the developed countries and this must be taken into account.81 Note the fact that 
the economic and not legal implications of the measure at issue were to be taken 
into account, as a major element in the panel ruling, was a great improvement. 
This depicts that the GATT approach for dispute settlement, was conciliatory and 
not binding upon the parties and was not legalistic or judicial in nature 
 
In case a GATT panel report was adopted, the question of its legal significance 
remained. As observed earlier, the aim of the dispute system was not to uphold 
the GATT law but to reach a consensus on its application. Evidently, panels’ 
recommendations were not mandatory for the losing party. The entire procedure 
rested upon the disputants’ good faith.82 A good example depicting the lack of 
binding obligation of panel rulings is the 1983 Nicaragua- US Case.83 Nicaragua 
initiated a complaint against the US alleging that the US decision to reduce the 
amount of Nicaragua sugar allowed to be imported violated the GATT rules on 
the administration of quotas.84 Although the panel ruled in favor of Nicaragua, the 
 
80 Decision of the 5th April 1966. BISD 14th Supplement (1967) 18, Paragraph 6 
81 Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 54, at Pg. 247 
82 Taxil B Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 75 at Pg. 129 
83 GATT BISD 67 (1985) 
84 Jackson, J.H., and Davey W.J., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials  
   and Texts. American Casebook Series, West Publishing Company, 2nd Ed, 1986, Pages 1153 and 916. 
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US indicated that they were not willing to change its practice. The only way for 
Nicaragua to obtain some sort of compensation would have been to retaliate 
against the US, that is, to impose restrictions on imports from the US. However, 
this would have been contrary to Nicaragua’s best interests and this measure 
would not have had any noticeable impact on the US economy.85
 
It is against the above background, that the debate as to the suitability of 
retaliation as a remedy over compensation prevails. It is not without a doubt that 
the inability for developing countries to retaliate has raised eyebrows and the 
usefulness of the entire dispute settlement system is put at risk if the developing 
and the least developed countries continue to shun the remedy of retaliation as 
being wholly unworkable for them. It is interesting to note that much has not yet 
been done to alleviate the above fears. 
 
3.6  Dispute Settlement under the WTO 
There are four general phases to post Uruguay round dispute resolution: (1) 
Consultation (2) Use of a panel; (3) Appeal to the Appellate Body; and (4) 
Surveillance & Implementation. The procedural steps are laid out hereunder: 
1. Informal Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Often times, a panel is not the first 
option to be tried, rather, the use of good offices, conciliation or mediation as 
under article 5 of the DSU. The use of good offices can be terminated at any time. 
If consultations fail to settle a dispute within sixty days or if the parties mutually 
agree that the dispute cannot be settled by consultation within sixty days, the 
complainant is entitled to request for the establishment of a panel as provided 
under article 4 (7) of the DSU. A panel can be established earlier in an urgent 
situation. 
 
2. Request for a panel: Under article 3 (4) & (6), the respondent must address the 
request for a panel within ten days of the request. Consultations should begin 
within thirty days. The complainant must wait at least sixty days from the day 
 
85 Ibid, Jackson, J.H. and Davey W.J at Pg. 1154, GATT BISD 67 (1985) 
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consultations were requested before seeking a panel, as per article 5 (4). The 
purpose of this sixty day ‘waiting period’ is to ensure that consultations are given 
adequate time to succeed. 
 
3. Formation of the Panel: The panel must be established no later than the first 
meeting of the DSB following the request. The requirement ensures that panels 
are formed expeditiously. The panel must consist of three persons, unless the 
parties agree otherwise within ten days of the establishment of the panel.86 
According to article 8 (1) and (4), if there is no agreement on composition within 
twenty days of establishing the panel, the Director General must pick the panelists 
at the request of either party within ten days of the request.87 
 
4. Operation and Functions of the Panel: As soon as practicable, the panel must fix 
the timetable for resolution of a dispute.88 Where feasible, the timetable should be 
set within one week of the composition of the panel and the establishment of the 
panel’s terms of reference. The panel must issue its report to the complainant and 
the respondent members within 6 months or three months in an urgent case.89 
 
5. Adoption of a panel report by the DSB: A panel report cannot be considered by 
the DSB until twenty days after the report is issued to the members. Members 
objecting to the report must do so in writing within ten days of the DSB meeting. 
The DSB must adopt the panel’s report within sixty days of its circulation to the 
members, unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it or a party to the 
dispute notifies the DSB of its intention to appeal the panel’s decision.90 
According to article 20 (1), the entire process from establishing of a panel to 
adoption of the report must take place within 9 months, or twelve, where an 
appeal lies. 
 
 
86 Articles 6 (1) and 8 (5) respectively 
87 Article 8 (7) 
88 Article 12 (3) of the DSU 
89 Article 12 (7 & 9) 
90 Article 16 (4) of the DSU 
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6. Appeals: A party may appeal a panel decision as per article 17. The Appellate 
Body must render a decision within sixty days, and in no case longer than ninety 
days. The DSB must adopt the report within thirty days of its circulation to the 
members, unless there is a consensus against adoption. 
 
7. Compliance: Within thirty days of the DSB’s adoption of a panel report, or an 
Appellate Body report, the losing Member must inform the DSB of its intentions 
regarding implementation of the recommendations contained in the report. 
Compliance is expected within a ‘reasonable period’, not to exceed fifteen 
months.91 
 
8. Compensation or Retaliation: If a panel recommendation is not implemented 
within a reasonable period of time, the loosing Member unable or unwilling to 
comply with the recommendation must enter into negotiations with the winning 
Member to develop a satisfactory scheme of compensation92or retaliation to be 
discussed below.  
 
3.7 Retaliation under the WTO 
By the end of February 2006, suspension of concessions was requested in twenty- 
seven cases and only authorized in fifteen.93 Article 23 of the DSU provides that 
WTO Members must use DSU procedures when they seek to remedy a violation 
of a Uruguay round agreement. In addition, it is provided that no Member may 
issue a ‘determination’ that another party has violated a Uruguay round 
Agreement unless a Panel or Appellate Body has first reached that conclusion.   
 
Once a Member is found in breach of the WTO provisions, it has two options in 
case it decides not to comply with its primary obligation to bring the deviating 
measure into conformity with the WTO agreements, that is, to specifically 
 
91 Article 21 (3) of the DSU 
92 Article 22 (2) of the DSU 
93 Article 22 (6) Arbitration Decisions’, available at:  
    www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/suspensionawards.asp. Accessed on 28 February 2006 Deleted:  
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perform the contract. It can either enter into negotiations with the injured Member 
to developing a mutually acceptable compensation94 or decide to endure 
retaliation, which essentially takes the form of suspension of concessions or 
obligations previously authorized by the DSB.95  
 
The complaining Member is basically authorized to unilaterally raise its tariffs 
against the wrongdoing Member. Both compensation and retaliation are 
temporary remedies and are merely instruments to restore the balance of 
concessions, with compliance as the ultimate objective; therefore, the primary 
remedy under the WTO is Specific Performance, that is, the withdrawal of the 
offending measures.96
 
If an agreement on compensation is not reached within twenty days after the 
expiration of the period allotted for implementing the panel or Appellate Body 
decision, a complaining party may request the DSB to authorize it to suspend 
concessions.97 In EC – Hormones, (Article 22.6 - EC), the Arbitrators set out the 
minimum requirements of a request for authorization under Article 22 (2) 1, the 
request must set out a specific level of suspension, that is, a level equivalent to the 
nullification and impairment caused by the WTO inconsistent measure, pursuant 
to Article 22 (4) and (2), the request must specify the agreement and sector (s) 
under which concessions or other obligations would be suspended.98
 
According to article 22 (3) of the DSU, the DSB must grant authorization to 
retaliate within thirty days, unless it decides to the contrary by consensus. Article 
22 (6) is to the effect that the party subject to retaliation may object to the level of 
 
94 Article 22 (2); See also Bhala Raj, International Trade Law, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 32 at Pg. 225  
95 Article 22 (2) DSU 
96 Article 3 (7) of the DSU 
97 Palmeter David and Mavroidis Petros, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation, Op. Cit,  
    Supra, footnote 8 at Pg. 266 
98 Article 22 (3), Decision by the Arbitrators, EC-Hormones, Measures concerning meat and meat Products,  
    original complaint by the US- Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under  
    Article 22 (6) of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB  
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retaliation, in which case the matter is then referred to arbitration. As a general 
principle, the complaining Member must first consider taking action in the general 
sector (such as goods, major services sectors, or particular types of intellectual 
property) affected by the measure in question. However, if it considers that such 
retaliation would not be ‘practicable or effective,’ the complaining government 
can then consider retaliation in another sector.  
 
The complainant in the circumstances suspends concessions it has granted under a 
Uruguay round agreement in the same general subject area as the Agreement that 
was the subject of the dispute. If the complaining party considers that even this 
type of retaliation would be impracticable or ineffective, and if it additionally 
believes that circumstances are serious enough, it may consider suspending 
concessions under an unrelated Uruguay round agreement, that is, it may consider 
increasing tariffs on goods in response to a violation of the Intellectual Property 
agreement. 
 
In assessing what type of retaliation to select, the complaining government is 
directed to consider trade in the relevant sector or agreement as well as broader 
economic considerations. It is the complaining government itself, however, not 
the DSB or a panel that makes the judgment whether a particular form of 
retaliation is ‘practicable or effective.’ The DSB must grant a complaining 
country’s request to suspend benefits within 30 days after the ‘reasonable period’ 
allotted for implementation of the panel or Appellate Body report has elapsed. 
However, the retaliation must be subject to the equivalence of the benefits that the 
defending country is impairing by its WTO inconsistent actions. The government 
facing retaliation may request arbitration if it considers that the retaliation is not 
equivalent to the actual loss of benefits. In such arbitration, the panel is not 
permitted to examine the nature of the concessions to be suspended. The panel 
must confine its inquiry to whether the levels of the proposed retaliation and the 
loss of benefits are equivalent. 
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Retaliation is to remain in place only until there is a satisfactory resolution of the 
dispute. Such a resolution may be achieved through removal of the offending 
measure, elimination of the nullification or impairment, or through reaching a 
mutually satisfactory solution with the other party to the dispute. The DSB 
monitors any retaliation applied pursuant to the understanding. 
 
Retaliation is depicted as the “Ultima Ratio” in WTO enforcement; it is a last 
resort adjudication, an interim measure till full implementation.99 Retaliation is 
self-executable, and is argued to be a strong deterrent against breaches of the 
WTO Agreements and apt to inducing compliance by the Member States. 
However, the fact that the defendant chooses to withstand retaliation rather than 
withdrawing the inconsistent unlawful measure goes far to disprove the fallacy of 
the remedy.100 Retaliation is only authorized if the respondent remains passive 
and it is designed to act as the ultimate safeguard for complaints willing to obtain 
satisfaction. 
 
3.7.1 Nature of Suspension and Rebalancing of Concessions 
The Suspension of Concessions or other obligations is essentially intended to 
restore the reciprocal balance of benefits between the Contracting Parties. The 
rationale for this is the legal maxim, “inadimplenti non est adimplendum,” which 
enables a State injured by a violation to restore the balance of rights and 
obligations in the sum total of its legal relationships with the violator on a lower 
level.101 This maxim was embodied in Article XXIII: 2 of the GATT 1947, which 
provided that ‘if the Contracting Parties consider that the circumstances are 
serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or 
 
99 Reif, T. & Florestal M., Revenge of the Push – Me, Pull- You: The Implementation Process under the  
    WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, International Lawyer, ISSN 0020- 7810, 1998, Fall, 755 –  
    788, Pg. 764 
100 As aptly put by Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement Op. Cit, Supra, 
footnote 42, at Pg. 7. There is a general rule in diplomacy, that    when choosing between evils, the evil in 
the more distant future is to be preferred. Retaliation as per Article 3 (7) is a last resort trade remedy, it is 
seldom used by the complainants and the defendants at times choose not to comply with DSB 
recommendations at the threat of retaliation, as it is deemed to be a lesser evil than specific performance of 
DSB recommendations. See EC-Bananas III (US) Article 22.6, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU 
101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60.1, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 346 
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parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such 
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement’. 
 
Suspension of concessions under article 22 plays a dual role. First of all, it 
provides a remedy for the nullification and impairment of the benefits suffered by 
the complainant and secondly, it aims at facilitating the implementation of the 
DSB recommendations. Suspension of concessions therefore can be referred to as 
‘Counter Measures.’ The term that is often used to refer to suspension of 
concessions, is ‘Retaliation’ which is not defined in traditional legal doctrine, but 
has a connotation of ‘war.102
 
Retaliatory measures taken by Members in accordance with WTO provisions are 
usually a withdrawal of concessions to the respondent’s exports. In such cases, the 
prevailing Member’s economy is not helped but further harmed by retaliation. 
This is the standard cost of protectionist barriers. Presently “the injured country 
then suffers twice, once from the restrictions on its exports imposed by foreign 
governments, and again when tariffs or duties raise the domestic cost of foreign 
goods selected for retaliation.103 To further understand the nature of suspension of 
concessions, it is necessary to expound the very essence of the principles that 
govern the remedy, as shall be depicted from the following sections. 
 
The notion of rebalancing the level of ‘nullification and impairment’ is embedded 
in Article 22.4, which provides that the level of the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the 
nullification or impairment. In EC - Bananas III (US) (Article 22.6)104, the 
 
102Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of  
      DSB Recommendations. Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 9 No. 2, 383–426      Oxford 
University Press 2006, at Pg. 418 
103 Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System,  
       Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 14/ spring 2003, at Pg. 13 
104 European Communities: Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- Recourse to  
     Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU 
Deleted: ¶
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arbitrators insisted on this choice as the relevant standard for the permissible level 
of suspension in WTO dispute settlement.105  
 
In legal terms, ‘rebalancing’ in WTO dispute settlement refers to the equivalence 
of two levels, that of suspension on the one hand and that of impairment on the 
other. The complaining Member is allowed to implement retaliation to a level 
equivalent to the violation’s ‘adverse impact’ as provided under article 3 (8) of 
the DSU. The dilemma however, is determining what either “equivalence” or 
“level” refer to, arbitrators ask members seeking authorization to suspend 
concessions to submit their calculation methodologies, neither these nor any other 
submissions not made to the DSB form a part of the arbitrators’ terms of 
reference. 
 
Article 22 (7) requires the Arbitrator to determine whether the level of retaliation 
for which authorization is being sought is ‘equivalent’ to the damage caused by 
the WTO inconsistent measure. The type of retaliation most commonly 
considered involves the complainant listing a range of products it imports from 
the respondent on which it will impose prohibitively high tariffs until the 
respondent’s offending measures are brought into conformity.106  The gross value 
of the imports to be prohibited, typically the average for the three most recent 
representative years for which import data are available, should match the value 
of the complainant’s imports excluded by the respondent’s WTO- inconsistent 
measure. 
 
However, ensuring equivalence between the damage and retaliation in terms of 
the gross value of trade between the respondent and the complainant does not 
mean that retaliation has the same economic welfare effect on the respondent as 
 
105 Holger Spamann, The Myth of “Rebalancing” Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice, Journal  
      of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, at Pg. 5 
106 Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, Discussion Paper No. 0207,  
     Adelaide University, Adelaide 5005 Australia, Centre for International Economic Studies, March 2002 
     at Pg. 7. See EC –Hormones: Measures concerning Meat & Meat Products, Recourse to Arbitration by   
     The EC under Article 22.6 WT/DS26/ARB 
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the initial damage suffered by the complainant.107 Holger Spamann does give an 
asymmetry of retaliation by using the analogy of apples versus eggs.108 The 
argument runs that it is not possible to balance the level of nullification and 
impairment through using the remedy of retaliation, the economic effects felt 
between the complainant and the respondent are always dissimilar. 
 
In EC- Bananas III (Ecuador), (Article 22. 6- EC)109 ” this was the first case in 
which cross- retaliation occurred.110 An important factor in this case was that it 
presented “considerable economic differences between a developing WTO 
Member and the Worlds’ largest trader, where a great imbalance in terms of trade 
volume and economic power existed between the complaining party seeking 
suspension and the other party failed to bring the WTO inconsistent measures into 
compliance.”111  
 
In the preceding case, Ecuador argued that most of its imports of goods from the 
EC were “primary goods” or “investment goods”, rather than “consumer goods.” 
Accordingly, Ecuador argued that it was not practicable or effective for it to 
suspend concessions in the goods sector. As an alternative, Ecuador requested 
authorization to suspend concessions under the GATS, where a violation also 
occurred, and under the TRIPs agreement where no violation had been found. The 
arbitrators determined that the EC had failed to show that it was both 
impracticable and ineffective for Ecuador to suspend concessions with regard to 
goods in the primary and investment goods area. The arbitrators went on to find 
that it was both practicable and effective for Ecuador to suspend with respect to 
consumer goods.  
 
107 Ibid, at Pg. 7  
108 Holger Spamann, The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 105 at Pg. 12 
109 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution  
     of Bananas, Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU,  
     WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, 24 March 2000 
110 Palmeter David and Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation, Op. Cit, Supra,  
      footnote 8at Pg. 276 
111 Ibid, at Pg. 276 
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As to services, the arbitrators also found that because Ecuador’s’ concessions 
were limited, it was correspondingly limited in its ability to suspend services 
concessions and accepted Ecuador’s proposal.112 Even with the fact that Ecuador 
was given the opportunity to suspend concessions in the TRIPs area, it was not 
able to suspend concessions effectively and thus rebalance the level of 
nullification and impairment, this was because the other WTO Members that 
Ecuador sought to export phonograms to without the authority of the EC owners, 
and who were not part of the dispute, remained bound by their obligations under 
TRIPs.113
 
In EC- Bananas III (US) (Article 22. 6 - EC),114 which was the first request for 
suspension of concessions under article 22.2, the U.S requested for authorization 
to suspend concessions covering only goods, under GATT 1994, although the 
underlying violation covered both goods and services under GATS. The EC 
objected, arguing that when findings of nullification or impairment are found in 
more than one sector, suspension must be commensurate with the harm 
experienced in each sector. The arbitrators disagreed, holding that “…the U.S had 
the right to request suspension of concessions in either of these two sectors, or in 
both, up to the overall level of nullification or impairment suffered, if the 
inconsistencies with the EC’s obligations under the GATT and the GATS found 
in the original dispute had not been removed fully in the EC’s revision of its 
regime.”115
 
In EC- Hormones,116 the U.S and Canada included in their requests for 
authorization lists of products that covered a significantly higher amount of trade 
 
    
112 Ibid, at Pg. 276 
113 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Article 51 is to the effect that 
Members’ Customs Authorities may suspend the release into free circulation suspected counterfeit 
trademark or pirated copyright goods.   
114 Decision by the Arbitrators, EC- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- recourse  
      to Arbitration by the EC under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, 9 April 1999 
115 Ibid, Palmeter David & Mavroidis, at Pg. 276 
116 European Communities: Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones- Recourse to 
Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS26/ARB) 
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than the amount of the suspension actually proposed. The EC objected, requesting 
that the U.S and Canada be required to submit lists of proposed suspensions 
equivalent to the level of nullification and impairment, after the determination by 
the arbitrators. . The arbitrators declined, noting that the DSU did not impose such 
a requirement. In the event that tariff concessions are to be suspended, the 
arbitrators said, “Only products that appear on the product list attached to the 
request for suspension can be subject to suspension.”117
 
It is argued that it is not reasonable to ensure equivalence through identifying of 
the retaliating measure with the violating one, because with asymmetric trade 
flows, even an identically specified measure will have different effects depending 
on the size and composition of the trade flow it applies to and in addition, it is not 
possible to use revealed preferences to approximate equivalence through 
reversion to the status quo ante that is, the mutual rights and obligations of the 
parties before conclusion of the trade agreement.118
 
Violation of the agreement is usually only partial whilst concessions are made on 
a Most-Favored-Nation basis. Suspension affects only the relationship with the 
responding Member. Multilateral trade negotiations usually lead to multiparty 
tradeoffs that cannot be undone bilaterally; and the aggregation of obligations 
over multiple rounds of trade liberalization means that the status quo ante is an ill-
defined concept.119 There is a need therefore for the development of a 
comparator, as article 22.4 of the DSU makes no such provision. The definition of 
impairment and nullification relate to the level of benefits destructed, which are 
not defined in the DSU. It has been argued by different scholars that the level of 
 
117 Ibid, Palmeter David & Mavroidis, at Pg. 267, EC- Hormones, Recourse to Arbitration by the EC under  
     Article 22.6, WT/DS26/ARB 
118 Holger Spamann, The Myth of “Rebalancing’, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 105 at Pg. 5 
119  Ibid, at Pg. 5  
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impairment should be the equivalent of the ‘trade effects’, which is based on 
Article 31 (4) of the Vienna Convention.120
 
3.7.2 Nullification or Impairment of Benefits /Violation Complaints 
The only situation where suspension of concessions is allowed is when “a 
nullification or impairment of benefits has been occasioned.” The concept of 
nullification or impairment lies at the centre of the bulk of GATT and WTO 
dispute resolution.121 A party seeking to formally challenge the behavior of 
another Member under Article XXIII of GATT 1994 has two broad options. It 
must either demonstrate that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly is 
being “nullified or impaired”, or demonstrate that the attainment of any objective 
of that agreement is being impeded as a result of certain actions and events. 
Practically, all GATT and WTO claims have concentrated on the nullification or 
impairment test as opposed to the attainment of any objective test. It would be 
particularly difficult to apply this test, as there would be a need to identify the 
objectives of the Agreement.  
 
In addition to the above, article 3 (7) of the DSU also provides that a Member 
shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under these procedures would be 
fruitful. Article 3 (7) gives leeway to WTO members to determine if they have 
Locus Standi. To illustrate this point, in EC – Bananas III,122 the European 
Communities (EC) claimed that the complaining party, the United States (US), 
did not have a legal interest in its claims since the US had only a token production 
of bananas and did not (and could not within the foreseeable future) export 
bananas to the EC. The EC requested the panel not to rule on the claims made by 
the US. The panel and the Appellate Body rejected the EC’s request. In particular, 
 
120  Ibid, at Pg. 6 
121 Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 12, at Pg. 88 
122 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and  
     Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, Para 132. 
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the Appellate Body stated that a Member is not required to show a legal interest in 
order to bring a matter before a panel.123  
 
The Appellate Body further held that it is trite law in all international litigation, 
that a complaining party must have a “legal interest” in order to bring a matter to 
court, it then noted that the same principle was not applicable to the WTO dispute 
settlement system, wherein a complaint may be admissible before a panel without 
proving a complaining party’s legal interest, as long as the complaining party 
considers in good faith that its benefits under the WTO Agreements are being 
nullified or impaired and that a recourse to the procedures under the DSU would 
be fruitful.124 The above statement has been interpreted to imply that a matter can 
be referred to the dispute settlement system irrespective of the individual interest 
of the Members.125
 
The concept of nullification or impairment contains many uncertainties, its 
meaning has been developed through panel deliberations using a mixture of 
textual and policy analysis.126  One key question to determine the legality of a 
complaint is to prove whether nullification or impairment exists. Article XXIII: I 
of GATT 1994 outlines three alternative instances where claims of either 
impeding of objectives or nullification or impairment can be made. The first 
refers to breach of obligations, the second and third refer to other measures and 
situations respectively. Since the latter two do not refer to breach as a 
precondition, it has been accepted that non-violation nullification or impairment 
claims can be made. The provisions combine conceptually distinct rights to 
challenge violation and non- violation activities. They neither define the key 
elements of nullification or impairment nor establish appropriate processes and 
procedures. 
 
 
123 Ibid, Para 132 
124 Ibid, Para 134 
125 Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System, Op. Cit, Supra,  
       footnote 102 at Pg. 389 
126 Waincymer Jeff. , WTO Litigation, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 12, at Pg. 89 
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Early GATT/ WTO disputes had to consider whether proof of violation of 
obligations was itself proof of nullification or impairment or whether there needed 
to be separate proof of some trade damage.127 If the latter was the case, a further 
question was whether the damage needed to be in the form of some existing effect 
on trade volumes or could merely be constituted by potential impact on trade 
opportunities. Because no clear guidance is provided on these questions within the 
article itself, it was left to GATT jurisprudence to resolve the matter.128  
 
The GATT jurisprudence developed the notion that breach of the rules by one 
party is prima facie evidence of nullification or impairment as codified in Article 
3.8 of the DSU. Being only a prima facie presumption, it remains theoretically 
possible for a party in breach to argue that the complainant’s rights were not 
nullified or impaired by the respondent. This is further confirmed in Article 3.8, 
which identifies that there is a normal presumption of adverse impact where 
infringement of obligations has been shown. It is then up to the member against 
whom the complaint has been brought to rebut the change. 
Article 3.8 of the DSU affirms that every infringement of WTO obligations 
presumably entails that there has been nullification or impairment of the benefits 
of another member.  
 
In Uruguay – Recourse to Article XXIII,129 the GATT Panel stated that 
nullification or impairment does not arise merely due to the existence of any 
measures, ‘the nullification or impairment must relate to benefits accruing to the 
contracting party’ under the General Agreement. The said findings imply that 
nullification or impairment can only be found when certain measures have a 
harmful effect on the benefits of a Member protected by the WTO Agreements, 
such as the expectations of a competitive relationship. 
 
 
127 Ibid, at Pg. 89 
128 Ibid, at Pg. 89 
129 GATT Panel Report, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, L/1923, adopted 16 November 1962, 
      GATT BISD 11S/95, Para 14 
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3.7.3 Non- violation or Other Situation Complaints 
There is no obligation to withdraw the measure by a party once a claim of a non-
violations complaint is made out and hence no right to retaliate arises. Three 
elements are required to be established under a non-violation complaint: first, the 
application of a measure by a WTO Member, secondly, there must be a benefit 
accruing under the relevant agreement and thirdly, there must be a nullification or 
impairment of the benefit as the result of the application of the measure. 
 
Article 26 provides special rules for cases where a WTO Member seeks redress of 
another Member’s action that, while not inconsistent with any Uruguay round 
agreement, nevertheless, results in benefits that should have accrued to it being 
“nullified or impaired” (so-called ‘non-violation disputes’). In initiating such a 
case, the complaining government must provide a detailed justification of its 
grievance. The remedy in a “non-violation” case differs from that of the usual 
“violation” case. Although there is no obligation for the defending government to 
withdraw the measure in question, that government must make a mutually 
satisfactory adjustment and compensation may be part of any final settlement.  
It has been argued that the concept of non- violation is both a useless and 
dangerous construction, derived from a merely grammatical turn of the words in 
the GATT.130  
 
In Korea – Government Procurement,131 the panel considered that the non-
violation remedy should not be viewed in isolation from general principles of 
customary international law. It considered that members should not take actions 
even those consistent with the letter of a treaty, which might serve to undermine 
the reasonable expectations of negotiating parties. The panel saw this as a further 
development of the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda. In the panel’s view, good 
faith performance has been agreed by WTO Members to include subsequent 
 
130 Pierre Pescatore, ‘The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present situation and its prospects’, 27  
     Journal of International Arbitration 5 (1993) at Pg. 19 
131 WT/DS163/R, adopted on the 1st May 2000 
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actions, which might nullify or impair the benefits reasonably expected to accrue 
to other parties to the negotiations in question. 
 
In conclusion, it can be deduced from the foregoing study that the GATT 
Institution, which was only meant to be a Protocol of Provisional Application, that 
largely depended on diplomacy and wherein might was seen to override rights, 
evolved into an International World Trading Institution, called the World Trade 
Organization, with a more rigorous and legalistic dispute settlement system. 
However, as the literature reveals, the main area of study, “Retaliation,” has 
always been a problematic remedy and to-date, still remains a controversial area 
of WTO law. As a last resort trade remedy, without retaliation as an effective 
remedy that can be utilized with minimum distress to the parties in the dispute, 
the intricacy in the implementation of the remedy shall negate the use of the 
dispute settlement system overtime.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH; PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF  
 FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The findings arising from the self-administered questionnaires and documentary 
evidence regarding the various variables are presented in this chapter. In general, 
the findings indicate that retaliation, as a trade remedy does not fulfill the 
objectives of the WTO as a trade remedy. There is an evident power imbalance 
amongst the members and indeed, the membership of the developing and least 
developed countries are dissatisfied with it, for want of capacity to utilize it as a 
credible remedy.  
 
The findings also depict that developing and least developed countries have made 
proposals in preference for compensation whether monetary or in the form of 
tariff concessions over retaliation. Most important, is the finding that there is an 
overwhelming support for the retention of retaliation as a trade remedy, thus 
showing that although it does not fully fulfill the objectives of the WTO as a trade 
remedy, it serves as a threat, enough to serve its justification as a remedy. 
 
4.2 Characteristics of Respondents 
The characteristics of the respondents include government Ministries, the Private 
Sector, Inter-governmental organizations, scholars and gender. 
Table 1: Respondents to the Self -administered Questionnaire 
 Frequency Percent 
Intergovernmental Organizations 2 4.2 
Government  15 32.6 
Private Sector 13 28.3 
Scholars 16 34.8 
TOTAL  46 100.0 
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Out of the planned 80 respondents for completion of the self-administered 
questionnaire, only 46 responded. This represents a total response rate of 57.5%.  
Of the 80 respondents, 30 were administered questionnaires via email whilst the 
other 50 were hand delivered. 
 
Table 2: Self-administered Questionnaire: Respondents by Gender 
 Frequency Percent 
Male 30 65.2 
Female 16 34.8 
Total 46 100.0 
 
Only 34.8% of the respondents were female. This study does not specifically look 
at the impact of women involvement in international and national trade; this poses 
a relevant field for future study. 
 
4.3 The Controversy of Retaliation  
4.3.1 Free Trade Principle 
The preamble of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization gives 
a prominent place to the principle of the mutual advantages deriving from the 
participation in the system. The preamble enumerates various objectives of the 
Contracting parties, as already enunciated in Chapter one of this study. 
 
The respondents were asked to indicate to what extent retaliation as a remedy 
succeeds in fulfilling the objectives of the WTO and the DSU. The relevant and 
respective objectives herein being: the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade and elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
relations, and the DSS being a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the Multilateral Trading System, as per article 3 (2) of the DSU. 
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Table 3: Objectives of the WTO and the DSU 
 Frequency Percent 
It does 7 15.2 
Partly 14 30.4 
It does not 25 54.4 
Total 46 100.0 
 
From the above responses, it is strongly suggested that the remedy fails to a large 
extent, in fulfilling the above-enumerated objectives. The norm of suspension of 
concessions by the injured State goes against the grain of the entire object and 
purpose of the agreement, and the system.  
 
Retaliation can be compared to avoidance of contractual obligations by the 
complainant to the extent of the breach of obligations by the respondent, or in the 
alternative, to the extent of the failure of the specific performance, which is the 
ultimate goal of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Suspension of 
concessions undermines the principle of free trade,132 it is tantamount to 
protectionism, which is economically inefficient and disrupts world trade. 
Retaliation raises new trade barriers, threatens the progress of liberalization and 
the integrity of the fundamental principles of free trade.133
 
The DSU provisions importing retaliation are self-defeating as far as the very 
object and purpose of the WTO is concerned, in that they are an example of 
mercantilist practice. They are based on the premise that protecting markets is 
beneficial and that it can offset the “nullification or impairment” caused by the 
WTO inconsistent measure and thereby force the losing member to comply with 
                                                 
132 Charnovitz S., Should the teeth be pulled? An analysis of WTO sanctions, in Political Economy of  
      International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec, D.L.M. Kennedy and J.D. 
      Southwick (Eds.), Cambridge UP, Cambridge, pp. 602-635, at Pg. 603 
133 Horlick Gary N., Problems with the compliance structure of the WTO Dispute Resolution Process, in  
      Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec, D.L.M. Kennedy   
      and J.D. Southwick (Eds.), Cambridge, pp. 636- 645, at Pg. 641   
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the rules. It is a paradox that the premier international organization established to 
promote free trade, makes trade sanctions a basic tool of the system.134
 
It was argued by Adam Smith in his famous work, “The Wealth of Nations” in 
1776, that the key to national wealth and power was economic growth.135 
Economic growth, he averred, is primarily a function of the division of labor, 
which is in turn dependent upon the scale of the market.  When a mercantilist 
Member erects barriers against the exchange of goods and the enlargement of 
markets, as noted by the respondents, it restricts domestic welfare and economic 
growth as the goods and services that, the member has competitive advantage in 
the formers’ market suffer from unjustified and exorbitant tariffs, which makes 
other uncompetitive producers have an edge in the market. The division of labor 
principle referred to here is the current practice by WTO Members of comparative 
advantage through trade concessions. 
 
It therefore distorts the economies of nations when these trade concessions are 
violated. It is astounding to note that, three centuries ago, Adam Smith noted that 
when a state erects barriers, in this case, tariffs, against the exchange of goods and 
the enlargement of markets, it restricts domestic welfare and economic growth.136  
It is even more perplexing that the contracting States of the WTO would come up 
with a trade remedy such as retaliation that is supposed to be ‘rebalancing’ the 
distorted trade relationship, whilst at the same time, the very same remedy harms 
the complaining State. 
 
The essence of retaliation is to execute justice to the injured party for the violation 
occasioned by the respondent, on a temporal basis, pending the withdrawal of the 
WTO inconsistent measure or as a prime remedy, if the respondent becomes 
inflexible in withdrawing the inconsistent measure. The centrality of justice to the 
 
134 Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System,  
       Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 14/ spring 2003, at Pg. 14 
135  See Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, 2nd Ed, Lexis Publishing, Lexis- Nexis,  
      Martindale- Hubbell, 2001 at Pg. 10 
136 Ibid, at Pg.10 
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analysis and construction of international economic law is evident in the nature of 
the concept of justice itself. Plato perceives Justice as being the ‘Right Order.’137
 
For Plato, whether there is justice, that is, whether right order exists, which in this 
study would imply ‘rebalancing of concessions’, depends on the resemblance to 
what is good. According to Aristotle who expounds this concept, when law and 
public institutions affect the allocation of social benefits or the correction of 
improper gain, they raise questions of distributive and corrective justice.138 In this 
case, retaliation cannot be perceived as just and right to the complaining party if it 
is tantamount to shooting oneself in the foot. 
 
Retaliation according to the concept of Aristotle is intended to be corrective and 
distributive justice, to impede and discourage the offending party from persisting 
with the offending measure. This however does not only affect the offending 
Member, but the complainant as well, and has the potential of harming the 
complainant more than the respondent. Given the two evils, either withdrawing 
the offending measure or facing retaliation, the latter (lesser evil) is always 
chosen by the respondent. Retaliation is one area of International Economic Law 
that acts as a mechanism for the identification and correction of improper gain 
through dispute resolution mechanisms on the inter-state level. This is an aspect 
of International Economic Law that must be evaluated in terms of theories of 
distributive and corrective justice.  
 
It is vital to recognize the link between trade and justice, the question herein, is 
whether retaliation can be perceived as a just remedy. The concept of ‘Free Trade’ 
may not be looked at only from a utilitarian view, but also from a rights 
perspective. The rights view of free trade is dependent upon the concept of 
sanctity of contract and the concept of comparative advantage that WTO 
Members choose to exercise. There is no fairness or justice if a Member decides 
 
137 Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 135 at Pg.37 
138 Ibid, at Pg. 37 
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to retaliate against another by erecting trade barriers of its own to punish foreign 
producers for their governments’ unfair acts. 
 
Fairness is a process and not an outcome, as intended to be achieved by the 
remedy of retaliation. In addition to that, erecting trade barriers of a Members’ 
economy is unfair to the domestic consumers, who must pay higher prices for 
foreign goods. The circumstances above are not as obvious, they have been 
overlooked, lest the DSU would not advocate for retaliation as a remedy. It has 
been argued that since suspension of concessions has visibly been preferred 
against compensation, sanctions between the U.S and the E.U have caused experts 
to worry about an upward twist of retaliation and counter-retaliation, which 
arguably puts the World Trading System at stake.139
 
The essence of retaliation goes further to reinforce the view that the disobedience 
and lack of political will and commitment is expressed by the WTO Members, 
wherein sanctions that are both detrimental to the respondent and the complainant 
are imposed. The fact that the respondent chooses not to implement the 
recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) depicts that the impact 
of retaliation may be more tolerable than implementation of the DSB 
recommendations as between the two evils.   
 
To understand the impact of an authorization to suspend concessions, it is vital to 
recall that WTO remedies are prospective. The level of suspension is calculated 
from the end of the reasonable period of time. Further to that, it is vital to consider 
the two principal aims of suspension; restoring the balance of concessions that 
was upset when one member violated its obligations, bearing in mind that it is a 
temporary aim since compliance is the preferred result; and giving the respondent 
the incentive to comply.140
 
139Lawrence R.Z., Crimes and Punishments? An analysis of retaliation under the WTO, Institute for  
     International Economics, Washington D.C., 2003, p.2 
140 DSU Article 22 (1). European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
     Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6, WT/DS27/ARB,  
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4.3.2 Want of Good Faith:  Retaliation and Developing Countries 
The argument reflected herein is to the effect that the system essentially relies on 
the capacity of the parties to the dispute to suspend concessions or obligations. 
Retaliation is an instrument of economic power to be used ultimately against a 
reluctant respondent. 
 
One of the reasons that the respondents identified in highlighting the failure of the 
remedy in addressing Members’ interests is the lack of good faith in the system. 
Article 3.10 of the DSU provides that the use of the dispute settlement procedures 
should not be intended or considered as contentious acts and that all members 
must engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. 
Below is a table where the respondents were required to indicate the usefulness 
(fulfillment of objectives of the entire membership) of retaliation as a trade 
remedy that is: developed, developing and least developed countries respectively. 
 
Table 4: Extent of Fulfillment of Interests of the WTO Entire Membership 
 Frequency Percent 
Fulfils 5 10.9 
Partly 13 28.3 
Does not fulfill  28 60.8 
Total 33 100.0 
 
The respondents noted that by virtue of the very fact that the dispute settlement 
remedy of retaliation does not recognize the power imbalance amongst the 
members, which makes it difficult for members to retaliate at all, or to retaliate 
with equal power and its continued use without heed to the outcry of small 
countries, raises doubt in the operation of the entire system.  
 
Engaging in dispute settlement should be in good faith, that is, with the genuine 
intention to see the dispute resolved, being part of the object and purpose of the 
                                                                                                                                               
     Para.6.3 (9 April 1999) 
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WTO dispute settlement system. If developing and least developed countries can 
not use the system to resolve disputes, there is no good faith to be perceived in 
commencing legal proceedings. It is argued that the new emphasis on retaliation 
probably makes the WTO dispute settlement system even more one sided than 
before. Retaliation by larger countries tends to be most effective when used 
against smaller countries. Consequently, by making access to retaliation more 
available, these new reforms give larger countries a still greater advantage over 
smaller countries that cannot effectively retaliate.141
 
The threat and effectiveness that counter-measures represent, highly depend on 
the existence and repartition of concessions between the countries involved in the 
dispute, as well as the quality of the concessions themselves.142  In Developing 
Countries, trade barriers are normally higher than in Developed countries. Also, 
the former often receive concessions from the latter, but not vice-versa. 
Suspension of Concessions has a commercial and welfare cost that can hardly be 
afforded by developing countries. Retaliation means raising barriers to trade, 
which is detrimental to the interests of the country that applies the remedy and 
also impedes world welfare.143
 
The retaliation threat provides an enforcement mechanism, which deters violation 
of trade agreements. However, this mechanism is limited by the severity of 
credible threat of retaliation. Retaliation must be sufficiently high to induce 
enough long-term losses in order to incite the defendant to match its trade practice 
to WTO rules. Therefore, the current rules of the dispute settlement procedure 
entail a bias against countries with weak capacity to retaliate. The nature of 
authorized sanction is likely, not only to discourage some countries to use the 
DSU, but more specifically, to influence the final outcome of the litigation. 
 
141 Hudec Robert E., The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 57, at  
      Pg. 81 
142 Qureshi, A.H., The WTO: Implementing International Trade Norms, Melland Schell Studies in  
      International Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 1996, at Pg. 143 
143 As depicted by Bhala Raj, International Trade Law: Theory & Practice, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 135 at  
      Pg. 10 
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It is argued that a sufficiently large country is better off under tariff war, making 
retaliation an inefficient tool by developing Members. A large Member capacity 
to influence its terms-of-trade significantly determines the credibility of its 
retaliation threat.144 This result explains why large countries are the main users of 
the dispute settlement system. Even if small countries are authorized by the DSU 
at the term of the procedure to apply retaliatory measures, their impact on terms-
of-trade is null and the threat is often regarded as non-credible. Thus, if the 
plaintiff is a large country, then the threat of trade retaliation can be sufficiently 
dissuasive for the defendant. In the opposite case, when the plaintiff is a small 
country, the long-term losses from retaliation are very low and have no influence 
on the defendant behavior. In the second scenario, the defendant will have no 
incentive to conform its trade policy (if its decisions are only guided by trade 
motivations). 
 
Trade sanctions of a large country plaintiff may have two effects; increasing its 
own welfare and decreasing the defendant welfare. These two impacts of 
retaliation influence all the more the final outcome of trade negotiation, especially 
during the stage of bilateral consultations. On the contrary, if the plaintiff is a 
small country, the retaliatory tariffs have a small effect on terms-of-trade, even if 
it can impose adjustment costs, its bargaining power is deteriorated by its low 
capacity to improve its own welfare with higher tariffs.145  
 
Two forms of retaliation in international economic scale have been emphasized in 
the economic literature. One deals with the bilateral economic assistance, which 
leads to close economic interdependence. In this context, such a variable may 
influence the dynamic of the procedure, the Member that receives economic 
assistance, in this study the developing countries, exercise self-constraint during 
the whole process in order not to jeopardize its privilege.  
 
144 Besson Fabien & Racem Mehdi, Is WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased Against Developing    
       Countries? An Empirical Analysis, University of Paris, at Pg. 7 Accessed at    
       www.ecomod.net/conferences/ecomod2004/ecomod2004-papers/199-pdf, accessed on 3rd January  
      2007 
145 Ibid, at Pg. 8 
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The second economic retaliation can be expressed under the perspective of pre-
existent preferential trade agreements between two countries or to their joint 
participation in a privileged trade area. The threat of economic relationship 
deterioration after litigation between two countries with close economic 
interdependence influences the litigant’s behavior during a dispute settlement.146 
The starting point of this degradation can then come either from the illegal trade 
practice (the defendant is economically depending on the plaintiff, which will 
seek to sanction it while carrying a complaint), or from the even complaint (the 
plaintiff is economically depending on the defendant, which is bothered by the 
plaintiff initiative and then will seek to sanction him). 
 
Given that the largest Members of WTO could not deploy retaliation as an 
ultimate enforcement measure of the DSU effectively, the prospects for 
developing countries or small economies are even bleaker.147  A recent example 
involves the DSB proceedings wherein Antigua and Barbuda challenged U.S. 
gambling laws. In April 2005, the DSB ruled that three U.S. federal laws and the 
provisions of four U.S. state laws were inconsistent with U.S. obligations under 
GATS. The dispute settlement body’s “reasonable period” of time allowed for 
U.S. compliance expired on April 3, 2006. The U.S. failed to comply with the 
recommendations to-date. Antigua and Barbuda now faces the dilemma of how to 
secure compliance from a significantly more powerful trading partner.148
 
Although the dispute settlement under the DSU is legalistic, the factual difference 
in economic power among WTO members is so glaring. This difference is more 
conspicuous in the phase of implementation of DSB rulings, as exemplified in the 
EC-Bananas’ III case.149 Consequent upon the EC’s failure to bring its banana 
regime into WTO conformity, Ecuador as the first developing country in 
 
146 Ibid, Besson & Rahem, at Pg. 11 
147 Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System,  
     Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 14/ Spring 2003, at Pg. 4 
148 United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and betting Services,  
      WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005. 
149 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
     Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R 
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GATT/WTO history requested the authorization by the DSB to suspend 
concessions to a developed WTO Member, the EC. The request was granted by 
the DSB, as recommended by an arbitration panel, in the amount of US$201.6 
million. Conversely, in the course of the proceedings, Ecuador recognized that the 
adverse economic effects of an actual suspension of concessions would be felt 
more by itself than by the EC, for the following reasons:150  
a) Regarding goods, higher tariff barriers would prevent EC products from 
supplying the Ecuadorian market, which was highly dependent on them. 
Hence, European companies, whose main export targets are the large 
markets of the EU itself, the USA and Japan, would barely feel the 
economic crisis. 
 
b) As far as TRIPs are concerned, Ecuador intended to export phonograms to 
third countries without the consent of the European right holders, thus 
suspending its obligations to the EC under Article 14 TRIPs (i.e. 
protection of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organizations). This attempt to improve Ecuador’s export volume however 
proved illusory. The arbitration panel clarified that all other WTO 
Members remained bound by their TRIPs obligations to the EC. 
Consequently, any third WTO Member country into which Ecuador would 
seek to export EU phonograms as above, would apply Article 51 TRIPs 
Agreement, obligating Members’ customs authorities to suspend the 
release into free circulation of those phonograms. The authorization of 
Ecuador to have recourse to cross-retaliation proved counter-productive, 
moderately due to Ecuador’s comparative economic weakness as 
compared to the EC.151  
 
150 The Arbitrators arrived at a figure of 60% market share for Ecuadorian service 
suppliers in distributing Ecuadorian bananas within the EC & Ecuador’s nullification & 
impairment as being US$ 201.6 million per year (European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, Paras, 169-170. Therefore, a 
conclusion can be drawn that raising tariff barriers to that tune would have immensely 
hurt the Ecuadorian market.  
151 Ibid, Paras 139-165 
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For developed countries, the move from a power-oriented to a more rule-oriented 
system contains little additional ambiguity, whereas for developing countries, 
such a move reinforces the traditional source of weakness, that is, the lack of 
market size and thus the lack of retaliatory power. 
 
It has been argued that a remedy such as retaliation is of use only to an economy 
as powerful as that against which it shall be leveraged, and that it will hurt the 
weaker country much more if it tried to retaliate.152 The developing countries are 
largely dependant on continuing trade relationships with the agricultural 
developed world. Most of these agricultural products end up in the economies of 
the developed world as their primary export commodity. These countries do not 
have likely alternatives, especially African countries, for use in retaliation. 
Retaliation by these countries in such circumstances would be akin to shooting 
themselves in the foot.  
 
A provision to prove the above scenario as to whether it is beneficial at all for 
developing and least developed countries to have recourse to the DSU is article 24 
which provides that WTO governments ought to give special consideration to 
least developed country members in deciding whether to invoke and pursue 
dispute settlement procedures. As a matter of fact, they are encouraged to settle 
disputes diplomatically, by requesting the Director General or Chairman of the 
DSB to provide good offices, conciliation, or mediation. 
 
As per the above argument, developing countries have greatly suffered from the 
dispute settlement system being dominated by the possibility and execution of 
retaliation. Once a developing country has successfully secured a ruling from the 
DSB establishing the inconformity of a measure by the defendant, the likelihood 
that the responsible Member will offer to pay compensation are almost zero. It is 
 
152Mosoti V., Does Africa need the WTO Dispute Settlement System? Towards a development–supportive  
      Dispute Settlement System at the WTO, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,  
      2003, 67-88, at Pg. 15 
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a trite fact and judicial notice as evidenced from the above case that developing 
countries cannot credibly retaliate against a powerful developed trading partner.  
 
The developing countries are left with a weak remedy, thereby indirectly 
restricting developing countries’ access to the DSS since the cost of litigation 
outweighs the possibility of any beneficial outcome. As illustrated by Ecuador, 
even after authorization to cross retaliate, the suspension of concessions under 
TRIPs failed to mount any pressure. The level of suspension of concessions failed 
to match the level of nullification and impairment, leaving the litigant 
uncompensated. Retaliation therefore is not an affordable mechanism for 
developing countries, given that the economies of the said countries largely 
depend on the trade of a single product with developed Members. 
 
The WTO Dispute Settlement System stands out by virtue of the broad scope of 
its jurisdiction as well as by the compulsory, exclusive and contentious nature of 
that jurisdiction. The dispute system has jurisdiction over any disputes between 
WTO Members arising under the covered agreements, according to Article 1.1 of 
the DSU. The fact that the Panel or Appellate Body makes recommendations to 
the parties with the desired result being the eventual withdrawal of the offensive 
measure whilst compensation and retaliation remain temporal measures shows the 
vital need to maintain good faith in the system.  
 
Retaliation is against the very grain of the above position. It would best suit the 
illustration by using the old English adage that “Two Wrongs, Don’t Make it 
Right!” In the face of failure by the respondent to comply with the 
recommendations, and in the absence of compensation for the complainant, 
retaliation is not the next best option in the resolution of the dispute; it shows lack 
of the desire to positively resolve the dispute. It turns out to be a ‘tit-for-tat game.’ 
What is more, retaliation does nothing to alleviate the WTO inconsistent measure 
suffered by the complainant industry. The illegal measure still stands as against 
that particular industry and continues to inflict the harm, further depicting the 
 63
                                                
satirical remedy of retaliation. Retaliation as a remedy is akin to forceful 
resolution of a political dispute; it is a remedy to induce compliance at any cost! 
 
In addition to the above, the respondent’s industries harmed by the complainant’s 
retaliatory measures are not the industries that previously benefited from the 
respondent’s WTO inconsistent measures. Rather, they are the ones that the 
complainant chooses for purposes of rebalancing the said concessions;153 hence 
perpetuating the recurrent unfairness of the remedy. Retaliation or suspension of 
concessions or other obligations is compared to the municipal law system of 
partial rescission of a contract, where equivalent non-performance by one party 
excuses performance by another, without vitiating the entire contract.154 No WTO 
Member commences an action with the objective of retaliation. Retaliation is an 
indication of a breakdown, a failure. When a right to retaliate is claimed, 
inevitably the grander issue of compliance is at play.155
 
In contrast to Article 94 of the UN Charter, it states clearly that each Member of 
the UN undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in any case, to which it is a party. It is evident that the multilateral dispute 
settlement system would be stronger if compliance were a mandatory obligation 
under International Law. It would also be fairer, in that the least developed and 
developing countries would be on a more level playing field. Most WTO 
Members, including the US, believe that compliance is demanded, that there is no 
option to choose among the alternatives of compliance, compensation, or 
acceptance of retaliation.156 It is hoped that eventually the custom and practice of 
compliance will evolve into Customary International Law. In conclusion, it was 
noted by the respondents that retaliation creates rivalry, mistrust and bad faith, in 
addition to being trade diverting. 
 
153 Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, Discussion Paper No. 0207,  
     Adelaide University, Adelaide 5005 Australia, Centre for International Economic Studies, March 2002,  
     at Pg. 10 
154 Palmeter David & Mavroidis Petros C., Dispute Settlement in the WTO, OP. Cit, Supra, footnote 8,   
      at Pg. 265 
155 Ibid, at Pg. 241 
156 Ibid, at Pg. 242 
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Preceding the above, retaliation as a remedy does not cater for the interests of 
third parties. Once the respondent fails to comply with the DSU recommendations 
and withdraw the WTO inconsistent measure, whilst the complainant will have 
the right to retaliate, third parties to the dispute are not entitled to the same right. 
Article 10 of the DSU governs third party rights in panel proceedings. To qualify 
as a third party participant, a government must have a substantial interest in the 
matter before the panel and must notify the DSB of this interest. Once qualified as 
a third party, a Member has the right to make written and oral submissions to the 
panel and the panel must reflect those submissions in its report.  
 
Only Members that participate in the litigation process are entitled to retaliate. 
Suspension of concessions or other obligations to the Member concerned 
discriminates against the non-complying Member only, and not against other 
Members, who are entitled to the continued benefit of the WTO Agreements. All 
the respondents explicitly stated that it is highly justifiable to keep retaliation as a 
trade remedy under the DSU, reason being that it acts as a deterrent mechanism; 
due to the grave threat it poses to members. It therefore restrains breach of and 
non-compliance with recommendations of the DSU. 
 
4.3.3  National Sovereignty  
It is vital to note that retaliation, as a remedy is controversial and unsuitable, 
because it affects the principle of state sovereignty. Unlike private litigants, 
governments are complex institutions that make decisions in their own peculiar, 
often irrational manner called “politics”. Even smaller governments are strong 
enough to be able to resist coercive forces that would move private litigants. 
Governments however, usually have a longer-term interest in the efficacy of the 
legal relationship they have established with other governments and so they are 
more inclined to act in ways designed to preserve those relationships. Ultimately, 
the compliance decisions of governments are determined more by calculated self- 
interest than by force. 
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Hudec argues that in his view, government compliance with legal rulings is 
usually the product, of at least 3 inter-related factors that influence the way in 
which governments make trade policy decisions.157 Firstly, some parts of the 
developed government’s decision making apparatus usually want the conduct 
called for by GATT legal obligations to be pursued for its own sake; because it is 
good policy, accordingly, such officials, and the private interest groups that share 
this view, constitute an existing political force within the defendant government 
and the effect of GATT legal rulings is to give them greater influence in the 
national decision making process. 
 
Secondly, many officials and private interest groups within the national 
government’s decision making process perceive a value in the legal system itself, 
believing that both they and their country will gain more over the long-term from 
an effective legal system than from non-compliance in an individual case. These 
actors may not want to tie their country’s hands through rigid commitments to a 
particular legal system or may not have enough political support to go that far, 
they will nonetheless argue strongly against non-compliance in individual cases 
that would damage respect for the system. Thirdly, Hudec argues that one should 
not under estimate the influence of active pressure by other governments.158 It is 
his submission that a majority of member governments believe in the value of an 
existing legal system, that these governments will have the same incentive to 
discourage non-compliance with the legal rulings and will express their views in 
the form of collective condemnation of non-complaisance.  
 
Hudec however avers that it is a valid deduction that even though the remedies 
available under the WTO dispute settlement system, in this particular instance, 
“Suspension of Concessions,” are unsuitable, it is nonetheless vital to institute 
proceedings under the dispute settlement system, for legal rulings sharpen the 
focus on the issue of compliance, and the normative force of such rulings 
 
157 Hudec Robert E, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 57 at  
      Pg. 83 
158 Ibid, at Pg. 83 
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increases the power of participants who favor compliance. Governments do not 
have enough political support to make trade agreements that are binding, when it 
is well suited for the country in question, they make trade policies of popular 
demand with the community, in violation of their WTO obligations.159
 
As noted, in Chapter Two, the GATT dispute settlement procedure almost never 
employed retaliation as an enforcement device. The fact that the GATT 
nonetheless produced a large number of successful legal rulings indicates that the 
internal government forces just described above; frequently did play a significant 
role in bringing about successful outcomes.  This is not to say that enforcement 
would not have been even more effective if more retaliation had been employed. 
Other things being equal, one would expect a better chance of compliance with a 
retaliation tool than without it. 
 
The key point however, is that legal rulings without retaliation can still be an 
effective policy tool for a developing country seeking to reverse a legal violation 
by a larger country. Although not invariably effective, in many cases it may well 
be more effective than the other practical alternatives. For the government that 
does not or cannot retaliate, these changes make it easier for the complainant to 
focus and maintain community pressures for compliance. 
 
Retaliation is still the final remedy for eventual non-compliance. In contrast to the 
GATT dispute procedure wherein retaliation was a vague and seldom used 
remedy, the new WTO procedure appears to make retaliation the central objective 
of the remedy structure. The defendant no longer has the power to veto retaliation 
requests. The WTO’s greater emphasis on retaliation as an enforcement tool 
appears to be somewhat misguided. Members must remember that enforcement is 
a more complex process than plain retaliation, involving the generation of the 
political forces needed to bring about the desired compliance decision. 
 
 
159 Ibid, at Pg. 83  
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4.4 A preview of Developing Countries’ Core Proposals 
A trite problem in the WTO dispute settlement procedure is the fact that small 
countries find it difficult to retaliate against large countries. Even when authorized 
to do so, small countries such as the Netherlands, Nicaragua and Ecuador, as 
discussed in the preceding chapters, have not actually implemented retaliatory 
responses. It is evident that under the current dispute settlement procedures, large 
countries have an advantage. Developing countries’ Members have supported 
moves to multilateralize retaliation.160  As is perceived by Davey, there is a more 
general problem with suspension of concessions. Whilst it is seen to work when 
threatened by a large country against a smaller one, and has worked when 
implemented by one major power against another, it may not be an effective 
remedy for a small country.161
 
4.4.1 Multilateralize Retaliation 
Since retaliation is perceived as a problem in the multilateral trading system, there 
have been proposals by developing countries to improve retaliation as a remedy, 
one of them being to multilateralize retaliation as a remedy. When put to task as 
to whether there is a mechanism for improving retaliation as a trade remedy, 
below are the responses that were deduced.  
 
Table 5: Whether there is a mechanism for improving retaliation as a remedy 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 5 10.8 
No 20 43.5 
Do not Know 21 45.7 
Total 46 100.0 
 
From the above responses, it is only 10.8% of the respondents who acknowledged 
that there is a mechanism for improving retaliation as a remedy, whilst 43.5%, did 
                                                 
160 Tanapong Potipiti, How to sell Retaliation in the WTO, Chulalongkorn University, March 2005, at Pg. 1 
161Davey William. J., Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement: An Introduction to the Problems and  
      Possible Solutions, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-013 March 2005, at Pg. 13  
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not think that it is possible to improve retaliation as a remedy. The respondents 
that categorically stated lack of knowledge as to the existence of other 
mechanisms for improving retaliation as a trade remedy expressed strong 
skepticism at the idea of retaliation as a suitable remedy, and any prospects for its 
improvement.  The 10.8% who averred that retaliation as a remedy can be 
improved, suggested collective retaliation and also indicated that it is not 
beneficial for retaliation as a remedy to be allowed generally, as it would not be 
effective.  A suggestion that retaliation be confined to the most affected sector or 
area, in which the violating member would suffer the most, was perceived to be 
more beneficial. 
 
A natural way to multilateralize retaliation is to allow it to be tradable. Mexico 
proposed in 2002 to make retaliation tradable.162 In this proposal, if a country 
were authorized to retaliate by increasing tariffs against a country, it would be 
able to sell the right to retaliate to another country. The respondents thus 
maintained that the only way to achieve significantly greater retaliation would be 
to develop a mechanism for trading the right to retaliate.  It is not surprising 
therefore that the proposal usually shifts to one for collective retaliation, asking 
that the GATT dispute settlement remedies include a proposal calling for 
collective retaliation. 
 
4.4.2  Collective Retaliation 
From literature available, it is a contention from different scholars that the 
inability to retaliate made the developing countries and the African Group to 
propose the amendment of article 22 (6) of the DSU to allow for collective 
retaliation in cases brought by developing countries against developed countries, 
this, it is contended, was inspired by the inability of Ecuador to retaliate against 
the EC.163 The African group proposal states that injury suffered is not 
 
162 Dispute Settlement Body Minutes, TN/DS/M/6, of November 13-15, 2002, accessed on 3rd January 2007  
     at: www.worldtradelaw.net  
163 The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Issues to consider in the DSU Negotiations, Trade- Related  
     Agenda, Development and Equity (TRADE) Analysis Series, South Centre, Trade Analysis, October  
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compensated satisfactorily in situations where the offending measures are 
withdrawn before or after the commencement of proceedings; and that trade 
retaliation is skewed against and disadvantages African Members. The LDC 
Group proposal says that the question of little or no utilization of the dispute 
settlement by developing and least developed country Members is linked to the 
inadequacies and structural rigidities of the remedies available to poor countries 
that successfully litigate a dispute.164
 
According to the preceding reasoning, it is further advanced that it is against 
conventional wisdom, and a waste of time and money for developing countries to 
invoke the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure against industrial countries.165 
The argument runs that even if a developing country obtains a clear legal ruling 
that an industrial country has violated its legal obligations, the developing country 
has no effective way to enforce the ruling. The only enforcement sanction 
provided by the WTO dispute settlement procedure is trade retaliation, the 
imposition of discriminatory trade sanctions by the complaining country against 
the trade of the developed country. Trade retaliation by smaller developing 
countries, it is argued, does not inflict any significant harm on larger industrial 
countries. In the end, the argument concludes, retaliation will harm the developing 
country it is supposed to protect.  
 
Hudec reinforces and reiterates the preceding contention, providing that the 
“Law” of the WTO does not in fact, give weaker Members the same protection 
that well developed domestic legal systems usually afford their weaker citizens. It 
is his submission that the remedies provided by the WTO system allow larger 
countries to exert significantly stronger enforcement pressures against developing 
countries than developing countries can exert in the reverse situation.166
 
     2005, from http://www.southcentre.org, accessed on 9th/01/2007, at Pg. 3 
164Ibid, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Issues to consider in the DSU Negotiations  
     http://www.southcentre.org, at Pg.  19 
165 Hudec Robert E., The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 57, at  
     Pg. 81 
166 Ibid, at Pg. 81 
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The standard complaint of developing countries about the remedy of trade 
retaliation is that it is too weak to be effective against large countries.167 The 
amount of retaliation is limited to the trade loss caused by the illegal trade 
measure in question.  Since individual developing countries tend to have only a 
small share of the defendant countries’ market, their retaliation measures can 
affect only a small amount of that country’s trade, usually not enough to cause 
any significant hardship for the large industrial country or its producers.  
 
Academic discussions of GATT/ WTO remedies usually arrive at the question 
whether GATT/WTO trade retaliation should not be measured according to a 
scale that would make certain that the amount of retaliation is large enough to be 
meaningful against large countries. Such proposals are usually justified by 
arguments that the law must have sanctions large enough to accomplish its task. 
Two objections are usually interposed against such proposals for proportional 
retaliation.  The most vital, is the assertion that the purpose of retaliation has 
never been to serve as a punitive sanction; on the contrary, the right to retaliate 
has always been viewed as a right to maintain the balance of reciprocity in GATT 
obligations. 
 
The starting assumption has been that the obligation undertaken by each Member 
involves a balance of benefits granted to others in the form of a country’s own 
obligations, balanced against the benefits that country obtains from the 
obligations undertaken by others. The theory is that a breach of legal obligations 
reduces the benefits being received by the complaining country and that, if the 
breach is not cured, the complaining country must be allowed to re-establish the 
balance by withdrawing obligations of its own. Such balancing however requires 
only retaliation equal to the amount of the benefits lost.168  
 
 
167 Ibid, at Pg. 86 
168 Ibid, at Pg. 86 
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This compensatory theory of trade retaliation has run through GATT law since the 
days of the negotiations on the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1947-
48. The significance of the history of the compensatory theory is simply that it 
shows a steadfast desire on the part of leading GATT members not to have a law 
with stronger sanctions. The second objection to proportional retaliation is a 
practical one; an individual developing country usually does not have a large 
enough market to assemble the amount of trade retaliation that would be needed 
to cause noticeable pain in a large industrial country, at least not without shutting 
down most of its own economy.169
 
The deficiencies of the WTO legal system in this regard do raise a legitimate 
concern for developing country Members whilst exercising their discretion in 
deciding whether it would be beneficial for them to employ the dispute settlement 
procedure against larger countries. In addition, these shortcomings raise the 
question of whether it would be worthwhile for developing countries to expand 
negotiating capital in an effort to remedy these shortcomings, and if so, what 
particular reforms should be sought.  
 
The proposals for the reform of the WTO dispute settlement procedures are not in 
black and white, it is a debatable issue whether the proposed transformation of the 
DSU would be feasible. It becomes pertinent then to examine the apprehension of 
how well the current system can work. Over three-fourths of the WTO’s Members 
are developing countries, and consequently, this question assumes great 
importance for a large majority of the Members. If instances of non-compliance 
go unchecked and cannot be remedied, it may not be very long before the 
euphoria about the WTO’s “giant leap” withers away and serious questions are 
raised about the efficacy of the dispute settlement system.170  
 
 
 
169 Ibid, at Pg. 86 
170 Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System,  
      Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 14/ spring 2003, at Pg. 4 
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4.4.3.  Compensation 
The present compensation scheme under the DSU depends upon the willingness 
of the respondent to negotiate, and there is no compensation for past harm. 
Scholars put forward the argument for financial compensation, averring that the 
crucial element of their proposal is the idea that financial compensation is not just 
about inducing compliance, but also providing equitable reparation for damages 
caused and in that light, that the DSU must be judged as a ‘lex specialis’, which 
sets forth its own system of remedies, and which limits the relevance and 
application of general principles of Public International Law to specific 
instances.171  The respondents were required to indicate whether there are other 
remedies that are more feasible than retaliation. Below, a summary of the 
responses is given. 
Table 6: Indication whether there are other remedies more feasible than retaliation 
 Frequency Percent 
Yes 22 47.8 
Do not know 24 52.2 
Total 46 100.0 
 
The responses from table 6 indicate that there is skepticism as to how other 
remedies can be more workable than retaliation. A total of 52.2% averred that 
they were not aware if there was a more feasible remedy than retaliation, this 
category of respondents acknowledged limitations to other available remedies, 
which curtail their operation as much as the retaliatory remedy.  
The remaining 47.8% of the respondents averred that there are other remedies that 
can be more viable than retaliation. Among the proposed remedies, compensation 
was vehemently vouched for. The other proposal by respondents was forced 
compliance, that is, compliance at any rate, through unified trade sanctions, 
though at the same time the respondents noted the major drawback to the latter 
suggestion being that; Members not privy to the dispute would soon tire of the 
sanctions. 
 
                                                 
171 Bronckers M. & Van den BroekWilmer N., Financial Compensation in the WTO-
Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement. Journal of International Economic 
Law 2005, JIEL 2005.8(101) Oxford University Press, at Pg. 6 
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Under the DSU, a discontent complainant of the respondent’s policy reform is 
entitled to seek compensation until satisfactory reforms are implemented. If 
compensation agreed upon is in the form of temporary lowering of import barriers 
on some other products, the changes must be consistent with existing agreements. 
In particular, they must be offered on a Most Favored Nation basis (MFN). In 
economic terms, compensation in the above form is trade liberalization, which 
boosts economic welfare in the respondent country, in the complainant country, 
and even in third countries that export the products whose import barriers have 
been lowered. Even if some third countries that import like products were to lose 
from terms of trade deterioration, the knowledge from standard gains from trade 
theory shows that the world as a whole would be better off economically.172
 
The demand for compensation or damages stems from the fact that the economic 
threat, which is implied in retaliation can not be seriously employed by 
developing countries against major industrialized Members as an effective 
substitute for compensation.173 It is worth noting that no least developed country 
has been involved in a WTO dispute neither as a respondent nor as a 
complainant.174 The special treatment afforded to Developing Countries has been 
the subject of criticisms, most provisions are difficult to enforce because of their 
want of precision. They have been described as hortatory in nature.175 The most 
obvious evidence of the ambiguity of the legal significance of panels and 
Appellate Body rulings is the idea of judicial restraint present in the DSU as laid 
down in Article 3.12 (18) which states, “Recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreement.176” 
 
172 Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 105 at  
      Pg. 5 
173 Jackson J.H. and Davey W. J, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Op. Cit, Supra,  
     footnote 84 at Pg. 352 
174 Footer, M.E., Developing Country Practice in the matter of WTO Dispute Settlement Journal of World  
     Trade, ISSN 1011- 6702. 2001, 35 (1), 55- 98, Pg. 73  
175 Qureshi, A.H., The WTO: Implementing International Trade Norms, Melland Schell Studies in  
      International Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 1996, at Pg. 143 
176 Jackson, J.H., The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO. Cambridge University Press, 2000 Pg. 186 
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Although Developing Countries trust that large developed countries will abide by 
the decisions of the new WTO dispute settlement, it still takes considerable 
courage and political will for Developing Countries to commence a dispute 
against industrialized Members.177
 
It is against the above background that an argument for damages is put forward by 
the developing countries. Until the end of February 2006, compensation was 
agreed upon in three cases.178 In two of these cases, the parties agreed on tariff 
reductions as compensation whilst in the other case,179 monetary compensation 
was agreed upon.180 It is argued that compensation is a less trade distorting 
measure that should be implemented in place of retaliation. Compensation being 
voluntary in nature, parties seldom attain an agreement and the complaining party 
often resorts to suspension of concessions. It is against this fact that the 
respondent is argued to compulsorily offer compensation to the complainant. 
 
Reference is made to the trite rule of International Law, which provides that an 
injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the offending State. It is 
further argued that it is not only the ICJ but also other international tribunals as 
well, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Iran -United 
States Claims Tribunal, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Tribunals, and human rights courts, have ordered payment of 
compensation to injured States.181
 
 
177 Darlin C.C., WTO dispute Settlement: Are Sufficient Resources Being devoted to enable the System to  
      Function Effectively. International Lawyer, ISSN 0020 – 7810. 1998, Fall, 863 – 870, at Pg. 868   
178 Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of  
      DSB Recommendations. Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 9 No. 2, 383–426 
      Oxford University Press 2006, at Pg. 411 
179 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/41, 26 
      February 1998, at 2; Turkey – Textiles, Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/ 
     116, 31 January 2002, at 20 
180 United States – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act (US – Section 110(5)), Notification of a Mutually 
      Satisfactory Temporary Agreement, WT/DS160/23, 26 June 2003. 
181 Yuka Fukunaga, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System  
      Op. Cit, Supra, footnote No. 178 at Pg. 412 
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 However, some authors aver that compulsory compensation is not a valid option 
and should not be introduced in the WTO dispute settlement system, reasons 
being that, it is debatable whether the respondent Member would actually comply 
with the order to compensate.  Tariff compensation may not be possible, as other 
producers in other sectors may strongly object to the proposal and the offending 
Member may find it impossible to secure compliance in other sectors whilst the 
complainant Member will have no recourse to force the offender from complying 
with the compensation order.182Therefore, as pointed out by some of the 
respondents, compulsory compensation shall not be a feasible and effective 
option. 
 
Compensation is a dual remedy; it can be in the form of tariff concessions in 
another sector or monetary compensation. It is argued that monetary 
compensation may not evoke resentment from domestic producers of the Member 
concerned and hence would be a lot easier to abide by the offending party. It is 
also argued that the explicit adoption of retrospective compensation that wipes 
away past injury may be a feasible remedy. It is understood that the purposes of 
compensation is to “wipe out all consequences of the illegal act” suffered by the 
injured State or its nationals.183 Though there is no clear mention of retrospective 
damages under the DSU, an acknowledgement of the same facilitates an 
agreement.184 It is on record that monetary compensation particularly is preferred 
by developing countries.185
 
The other argument is that monetary compensation allows for the provision of 
non- most favored nation (non- MFN) compensation. Compensation would be 
consistent with the MFN principle, if it took the form of tariff reductions. The 
rationale for this is the well- established policy perspective that a discriminatory 
 
182 Ibid, at Pg. 412, quoting Bronckers and Broek, at 107–08 
183 Factory at Chorzów, 1928 P.C.I.J., at 47; Draft Articles, Article 36 
184 See Gavin Goh and Andreas R. Ziegler, ‘Retrospective Remedies in the WTO after Automotive    
      Leather’, 6 JIEL 545 (2003 
185 Mosoti V., ‘Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement  
      Process: A View from Sub- Saharan Africa’, 48 Neth. Int’ IL. Rev. 319 (2001), at 345- 47 
      See also Yuka Fukunaga, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote No. 95 at Pg. 415 
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trade policy could distort trade, increase transaction costs, and thereby undermine 
the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system. Nevertheless, the 
same policy reasons do not apply to monetary compensation. Monetary 
compensation, unrelated to particular import or export transactions, neither 
distorts trade nor increases the transaction costs; no policy reason appears to 
successfully refute non- MFN monetary compensation.186
 
Criticism centres on retaliation being highly ineffective to induce compliance of 
DSB recommendations. As a result, a more worthy remedy is sought that will 
pinch a hole in the pockets of the respondent Members concerned. Compensation, 
be it tariff or monetary, is believed to carry that weight. In addition to the above, 
the suspension of concessions may not effectively influence the trade flows and 
trade policies of the Member concerned. As an elaboration of the above point, an 
example of the US and the EC is given as the worst record holders with regard to 
the implementation of the DSB recommendations.187
 
However, there is a major drawback to the proposed remedy of monetary 
compensation. As a matter of sovereignty of nations, it is odd to think that a WTO 
Member would accept that any part of its trade regime could be changed 
unilaterally, if only temporarily, by another WTO Member. Yet if ‘mandatory 
compensation’ amounts to no more than an obligation on the non-complying 
country to offer compensation, the risk is that a Member not complying with a 
ruling will not comply with this obligation either.188 Domestic industries, being 
innocent bystanders to a particular dispute, will still not accept that they suffer 
adverse consequences to resolve problems of non-compliance in another sector. 
 
The respondents however noted that offering tariff compensation might encounter 
problems. Being a direct measure where the connection between cause and effect 
 
186 Ibid, at Pg. 415 
187 Ibid at Pg. 416 
188 Bronckers M. & Van den BroekWilmer N., Financial Compensation in the WTO, Op. Cit, Supra,  
      footnote 171, at Pg. 18 
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is a straightforward case, the rules of collective action will bring out the violent 
opposition of the (concentrated and well-organized) losing industries. The import-
competing industries in the liberalized industry would be quick to point to huge 
job losses and dumped imports of inferior quality connected with the 
compensatory measure. 
 
It is argued that since compensation has to be offered on an MFN basis, it is not 
old-fashioned mercantilism that makes policymakers believe that offering MFN 
liberalization is bad, but rather enlightened self-interest.189 It is perceived that 
paying off an injured Member would not be problematic; however, a unilateral 
liberalization on an MFN basis will have major domestic repercussions from 
affected parties. Also, the compensation has the potential to upset the (carefully 
carved) multilateral balance of concessions in a way not hitherto planned by trade 
policymakers. 
 
It is further argued that compensation is costly, as the terms of trade and time 
gains are foregone.190 Compensation, it is stated, internalizes the economic costs 
connected with protectionism. It clearly happens at the expense of the 
protectionist country. Offering voluntary compensation, in contrast to violation-
cum-retaliation, is happening very early on in the process, in addition, the 
possible terms-of-trade gains for large countries are deliberately foregone through 
the compensatory policy measure. 
 
It is now debatable, whether safeguard actions under Art. XIX GATT or 
compensated breach of the WTO under DSU Art. 22, is more attractive to 
policymakers. Safeguard actions have a high threshold of application, but the 
SGA (Art. 8 (1) grants a three-year grace period before the enacting country has 
to offer compensation. Compensated violation, on the other hand, does not come 
 
189 Froukje B., Schropp S., Tovaglieri F., Compensate Before You Retaliate – And Comply At Any Rate":  
     The Case for Tariff Compensation in the WTO, Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva, at  
     Pg. 24 
190 Ibid, a Pg.25 
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with procedural strings attached, but inflicts onto policy makers reputation 
damages of a lost litigation, as well as the cost of litigation connected.  
 
In conclusion, the findings presented herein largely depict that retaliation as a 
remedy is highly controversial and goes against the spirit and notion of the WTO 
system, as well as the principles of the DSU. Particularly, retaliation has been 
presented to be a negative trade remedy that must be re-evaluated by the WTO 
Members. The remedy of retaliation is under debate by various scholars, 
practitioners and academics, and yet, there has not been an agreement upon a 
satisfactory mode, for improving retaliation as a trade remedy. 
 
However, it is recognized that the fear for loss of National Sovereignty is a major 
impediment to creating more plausible and effective remedies such as damages, 
for dispute settlement. Nonetheless, from the findings, it has been acknowledged 
that in the absence of an alternative last resort remedy at the failure of compliance 
with DSB recommendations, the threat of retaliation to the blameworthy party 
validates its retention as WTO Law. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Arising from the literature review and the analysis of findings, the following 
recommendations are made: 
Having an Effective Enforcement Mechanism, if an enforcement mechanism is 
effective, the result is the successful loss and diminishment of Sovereignty and 
autonomy of action by the target Member. The effective loss of autonomy and 
power is a cost that does not affect each prospective treaty party equally. Effective 
enforcement mechanisms restrict State autonomy to a common denominator with 
regard to matters covered by the treaty; the norm, obligation or restriction set out 
by the treaty. The result is to restrict the powerful, those who have more 
autonomy, control, and options to begin with, much more than others.  
 
As a result of the above, the effects of the loss of autonomy and power are 
strongly asymmetrical. The asymmetry suggests that the most powerful Members 
stand to lose the most from effective enforcement mechanisms and defacto, are 
least likely to support such mechanisms. Related to the sovereignty and political 
institution explanation, is the argument that States face a reciprocal-conflict 
problem.  Most breaches of International Law are intentional, and it is because of 
the intentional nature of breaches that the law of state responsibility deals with 
facilitating the efficient operation of unilateral retaliative strategies aimed at 
preventing opportunistic defection. Perhaps, for political or other reasons, the 
system was designed with a presumption that disputes would not originate from 
intentionally noncompliant actions by parties and that a formal finding of non-
compliance would be necessary to establish notice and awareness on the part of 
the noncompliant Member. This view comports with the premises of the 
managerial theory of compliance. 
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Surveillance: The WTO Members should have committees or working groups 
systemically to examine the trade measures of particular Members, conceivably 
on a rotating basis and to comment on the GATT consistency or policy 
appropriateness of such measures.191 As it is widely evidenced that negotiations 
aim to develop understandings and arrangements: to enhance the surveillance in 
the GATT to enable regular monitoring of trade policies and practices of 
contracting parties and their impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system. In addition to the above, a GATT body should report semi- annually as is 
now done, on the status of the trading system, to flag discrepancies between 
measures actually taken, such as the ‘gray area’ or export- restraint arrangements, 
of such measures.192
 
Payment of Fines or Damages: Bearing in mind the unsuitability of retaliation as 
a trade remedy under the WTO dispute settlement understanding, it is appropriate 
to explore payment of fines or damages as an alternative, although this may be 
faced with the problem such as the difference in fine- paying ability among WTO 
Members. The system would have to be designed to avoid the possibility that rich 
Members could effectively buy their way out of obligations in a way not available 
to the poor Members. It is proposed that this could be accomplished by tying the 
amount of fines to the size of the Member’s economy, or otherwise provide for a 
sliding scale that would minimize “discriminations” against poor Members.193
There should be some degree of retroactivity so as to encourage compliance 
within the reasonable period of time; and adjustment mechanism to increase the 
sanctions overtime, so as to preclude non-compliance from becoming an 
acceptable status quo position. 
 
 
 
 
 
191 See Ministerial declaration GATT, BISD 33 Supp.19; GATT/1396, 25 September 1986, Part 1 (e) (i) 
192 Jackson, John H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 42 at Pg. 137 
193 Davey William J., Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement Op. cit., Supra, footnote 161 at pg. 13 
 81
                                                
Freedom to elect between Suspension of Concessions and Compensation:  
A customary party should be allowed to elect between suspension of concessions 
and receipt of a periodic monetary payment.194 Though there is an evident 
hindrance such as the enforcement problem, in that it may be difficult to ensure 
that the payment is made, the right to receive a payment is still more valuable and 
attractive than the never used and probably unusable right to suspend concessions, 
which is so detrimental to the interests of developing countries. There are 
indications that payments of fines or damages may be gaining in acceptability as 
evidenced in the US free trade agreements, and the recent case where the U.S 
Congress authorized around $50 Million for the U.S to use in paying damages in 
trade cases.195
 
Retrospective Assessment: Customary International Law provides for both 
prospective and retrospective remedies in international dispute settlement. A state 
found to be acting inconsistently at International Law has an obligation both to 
stop the illegal act (prospective), and to provide reparation for the damage 
suffered by the injured party (retrospective.196) Members of the WTO should 
consider introducing this International Law principle into WTO Law and allow 
payment of retrospective damages; this shall be a viable step in actually 
rebalancing of concessions. The Appellate Body considered that the General 
Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from Public International Law.197  
 
The respondent is normally given a reasonable period of time to comply with the 
recommendations of the DSB or Appellate Body, and still, this provision is 
abused. To counter this quandary, and to create incentives for prompt compliance, 
it should be provided that any remedy, be it retaliation or money payment, should 
be calculated from a date prior to the one set for implementation, that is, the date 
 
194 Hudec Robert. E. Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, Op. cit., supra,  
     footnote 42, pg. 14 
195 Gavin Goh & Andreas R. Ziegler, Retrospective remedies in the WTO after Automotive Leather,  
      Journal of International Economic Law 6 (3), 545- 564, Oxford University Press 2003, at pg. 553 
196 Ibid, at pg. 553 See Chorzów Factories case, Op. Cit, supra, footnote 1 
197 WTO Appellate Body Report, US- Standards for reformulated and conventional Gasoline (US-  
      Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20th May 1996, at pg. 17 
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of adoption of the said report, as is the case in civil judgments in respective 
domestic jurisdictions. This would be an inducement for prompt compliance. 
 
Increasing Sanctions over time: An increasing sanction over time seems to offer 
possibilities for improving implementation. Such a procedure would help to avoid 
the perception that the payment of fines or damages is simply an alternative to 
compliance. In a sense, this concept has been used by the EC in the FSC case, 
where the duty it imposed on a long list of US products started at 5%, was 
increased at a rate of 1% each month.198 The monthly change focused attention on 
the case each month and the impeding increase, even if small, created an incentive 
to act so as to forestall it. 
 
Early settlement of disputes by Developing Countries: It is argued that ‘early 
settlement’ offers the greatest likelihood of securing full concessions from a 
defendant at the GATT/WTO.199 It is further argued that it is the threat of legal 
condemnation, rather than a ruling per se that induces settlement. As noted by a 
scholar, no functioning legal system can wait until the verdict stage to exert its 
primary impact.200 Hence Developing Countries should capitalize on early 
settlement of disputes than commencement of litigation, which is expensive for 
them, and yet still, after the acquisition of the Panel/ Appellate Body rulings, 
enforcement of compliance or worse still, suspension of concessions is 
impractical in their situation. Therefore, due to a lack of legal capacity, 
Developing Countries need immense assistance before commencement of 
litigation, that is, they should be facilitated more at the consultation stage and 
negotiations before the establishment of a panel. 
 
 
198Hudec Robert. E. Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, Op. cit., supra,  
     footnote 42 at pg.15 
199 Busch M.L. and Reinhardt E., Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/  
     World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, Journal of World Trade 37(4): 719- 735, 2003, Kluwer  
     Law International at Pg. 720 
200 Hudec, Robert E. (1993), Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT 
       Legal System (Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers), at Pg. 360 
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Differential treatment between Retaliation and Compensation: Differential 
treatment of remedies could be to base the calculation of compensation on 
prospective trade damages, while letting retaliation be based on retrospective 
trade damages. Although the prospective element of damages in the WTO has 
been recognized as a general principle so far, there seems to be room for change 
towards an ex nunc determination of damages. Countervailing Duties and Subsidy 
cases have regularly applied the thinking of retroactivity, so it is fair to say that 
the concept per se is not alien to the WTO. Indications in the direction of this 
change can be found in proposals made by several countries, academics but also 
in the decision in the Australia – Automotive Leather case.201 Discrimination in 
trade remedies establishes a real trade-off for policy makers in the violating 
Members. 
 
Collective Retaliation: As noted by the respondents, collective retaliation is an 
option that should be investigated in the attempt to improve retaliation as a 
remedy for developing countries that cannot singly retaliate on their own. It is 
also important that motivated and genuine effort to take into consideration the 
views of poor and developing countries rather than dismissing their proposals.202 
Therefore, the proposal by the African group for collective retaliation should be 
taken into consideration and investigated as to its potential of being workable, 
other than attracting a mere dismissal. 
 
Promotion of the Good faith Principle: Members of the WTO should be 
encouraged to commence and settle disputes in good faith. It is often overlooked 
that the legitimacy of a dispute settlement system flows not only from the 
 
201 Australia- Subsidies Provided to Producers & Exporters of Automotive Leather WT/DS126/RW,  
     Adopted 11 February 2000 
202 Mosoti V., Does Africa need the WTO Dispute Settlement System? Towards a development–supportive 
dispute settlement system at the WTO, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 2003, 
67-88, at Pg.6.See African Group's Proposal (WTO Doc. TN/DS/W/15) for reform of the DSU to the effect 
that collective retaliation should be included in the DSU. Immediately, upon submission of this proposal for 
change, a developed country envoy was quoted remarking that "there is no chance such a change would 
ever be approved. It's just a non-starter." See Robert Evans, Africa Asks for Mass Retaliation in Trade 
Rows, September 11 2006 (Reuters) http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/09/11/trade.disputes.reut/ 
(last visited on October 23, 2002). 
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effectiveness of its remedies ex post, but also in dissuading parties from engaging 
in particular behavior ex ante. To that end, the continuing function of moral 
suasion reflected in the Customary International Law principle of good faith in 
promoting observance of GATT/WTO obligations must be highly accredited.203  
It is no wonder that in its 50 years of GATT 1947 existence, the remedy of 
retaliation was only resorted to in one occasion as seen in Chapter Two to this 
study, this further goes to confirm the undesirability of the remedy itself. 
 
Rewarding Prompt Compliance: In the current system, prompt compliance 
could be rewarded, thus creating an incentive for the Member to adhere to the 
ruling. However, this may work only in a few cases, and the injured party may be 
tempted to take unilateral action in such cases, which may create more 
complications for the treaty system itself.204
 
Contributing to Retaliatory Cost of Small Countries: It has been proposed by 
the World Bank study that consideration be given to the notion that other WTO 
Members contribute to the cost of small countries taking retaliatory action, so as 
to reduce the risk of large trading States remaining WTO-inconsistent (Horn and 
Mavroidis 1999).205 However, the above idea assumes an exceptional and 
infrequent commonality of interests among WTO Members. Many small States 
may never muster the courage to join in this collective action when the losing 
Member is disproportionately strong and has an attractive market. 
 
Invoking the Principles of Equity: As recommended by the respondents, the 
principle, “He who comes to Equity, must come with clean hands” must be 
applied. The best and most effective remedy would be to prohibit a member from 
invoking the jurisdiction of DSU unless it complies with the earlier ruling. After 
all, how can a Member seek assistance from an institution whose decision and 
 
203 Article 26 (Pacta Sunt Servanda) of the Vienna Convention provides that: ‘Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.’ 
204 Asim Imdad Ali, Non-compliance and Ultimate Remedies Under the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
Journal of Public and International Affairs, Volume 14/ spring 2003, at Pg. 17 
205 Ibid, at Pg. 17 
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authority it challenges by non-compliance with its rulings? Such a remedy would 
provide an incentive to the member to comply with the rulings but would not be 
so onerous as to provide it an incentive to break away from the international trade 
regime. 
 
Cross Retaliation: In light of the limited effectiveness of conventional economic 
retaliation, the suspension of WTO Member commitments under GATS and 
TRIPs may prove more effective in securing implementation of the DSB 
rulings.206  In part, because large multinational corporations based in wealthy 
countries stand to benefit enormously from the commitments made by poor 
Members under both GATS and TRIPs and so have a strong interest in these 
obligations being respected. These companies exert considerable political 
influence in the countries where they are based. 
 
Taking into Account the Development Implications of DSB Rulings: Both the 
Least-Developed Countries Group and the African Group have proposed adding a 
requirement that a panel make findings on the “development implications” of the 
issues in a case and consider any “adverse impact” that its findings may have on 
the social and economic welfare of a developing country in a case. The DSB is to 
take such findings into account in making its recommendations. However, given 
the controversies over what policies are in the best development interest of 
developing countries (the views of the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, for example, are not in any sense uniform 
on these issues), it is not clear what such a requirement would add in practice.207
 
 
 
206 Ben Lilliston, “Strengthening a Culture of Compliance: The potential use of cross-retaliation by WTO  
       Developing Member countries”, IATP Trade and Global Governance Program, 2006 
207 Davey William J., Reforming WTO Dispute Settlement, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory  
       Research Papers Series, Research Paper No. 04-01, 2004, at Pg. 40 
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5.2 CONCLUSION 
The argument in favor of International trade can be simplified as follows: (1) 
competitive markets are generally the most efficient way to provide private goods 
to consumers; (2) international trade simply involves competition between 
domestic and foreign firms in domestic markets; (3) government-imposed 
restrictions on international trade, whether tariffs, subsidies, quotas, or regulatory 
measures, artificially raise the costs of foreign firms, reduce the scope of entry 
and reduce competition; and (4) removing existing restrictions on international 
trade makes markets more competitive, is generally efficient, and is thus 
economically desirable.208
 
It warrants emphasis that the purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is not 
to secure compliance irrespective of the specific injury, but rather, to settle 
disputes and remedy the injury.209 Having considered the feasibility of retaliation 
as a trade remedy, it is my considered opinion that it is highly unworkable as 
against Developing Countries, let alone all African and least developed countries.  
 
The impracticability of the remedies under the DSS has made the system repellent 
to the developing Members since the cost of litigation would outweigh the 
benefits as already seen. As noted by Mosoti,210 the lack of participation by large 
sections of the WTO Membership, such as African countries, is a danger to the 
long-term 'predictability' function of the WTO and could undermine the 
usefulness of the entire process eventually. It is therefore in the interests of all 
WTO Members to work towards resolving the problems that prevent them from 
making use of the system when they need to. This is because, as a whole, the 
dispute settlement process may be viewed as a public good whose usefulness and 
 
208 Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, Buffalo Law Review, Vol.51,  
     2003, at Pg. 751 
209Yuka Fukunaga, Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of  
      DSB Recommendations. Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 9 No. 2, 383–426 
      Oxford University Press 2006, at Pg. 386 
210 Mosoti V., Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, Journal of International Economic  
     Law, Oxford University Press 2006, JIEL 2006 9 (427) at Pg.4  
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proper functioning is in the interest of all players, be they developed or 
developing countries. In particular, it serves all members' interests to ensure that it 
remains credible and functional. 
 
It is evident that the lack of feasible remedies in the WTO dispute settlement 
system has discouraged and disbarred some Members completely, especially the 
African countries in participating in the dispute settlement system. It is important 
to highlight the importance of participating in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. As put forward by Shaffer,211 it is important for developing Members to 
participate in the WTO Dispute Settlement System matters for shaping WTO Law 
and International Economic Relations. He further argues that participation in 
WTO judicial processes is arguably more vital than is participation in analogous 
judicial processes for shaping law in national systems. He goes ahead to give two 
reasons as follows: 
1. The difficulty of amending or interpreting WTO law through the WTO 
political process enhances the impact of WTO jurisprudence, unlike 
national or EC law, WTO law requires consensus to modify, so that the 
WTO political/ legislative system remains extremely weak. Changes in 
WTO rules only take place through in frequent negotiating rounds (held 
around once per decade), involving complex tradeoffs between over one 
hundred and forty countries with widely varying interests, values, levels of 
development and priorities. In addition, because of the complex 
bargaining process within the WTO, rules are often purposefully drafted in 
a vague manner as part of a political compromise. WTO members thereby 
delegate significant de facto power to the WTO dispute settlement system 
to interpret and effectively make WTO law. 
 
2. Although it does not formally adopt a common law approach, the WTO 
takes a Common law orientation, with the WTO Appellate Body and 
 
211 Shaffer Gregory, How to make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries:  
      Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, Working Draft: Feb 14, 2003 at Pg. 9, 10 & 11 
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WTO panels citing and relying on past WTO jurisprudence in their legal 
reasoning. Individual WTO cases involve more than the judicial resolution 
of an individual dispute. WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions also 
produce systemic effects for future cases. As a result of the increased 
importance of WTO jurisprudence and the rigidity of the WTO political 
process to modify it through legislation, those governments that are able to 
participate most actively in the WTO dispute settlement system are best-
positioned to effectively shape the law’s interpretation and application 
over time to their advantage. Not surprisingly, the United States and EC 
remain by far the predominant users of the system, and thereby are most 
likely to advance their larger systemic interests through the judicial 
process.  
 
Concern is raised212that in addition to the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness 
of existing international rules, there are several important policy issues about rule 
implementation, which often do not get explicitly addressed. One of the concerns   
averred, is the issue whether the legal system be improved to make rules more 
effective, and second, whether new rules should be added and be made more 
effective. It is further argued that in international economic affairs, many 
government and private practitioners are not all in favor of an effective 
international rules system.213   
 
Part of the contention for the real or concealed and implicit opposition to the 
effectiveness of international rules, is acknowledgment of the older concepts of 
national Sovereignty.214 This explains the reason why the GATT/WTO system of 
remedies is as they are. As indicated, since the time when the GATT was 
conceived, the remedy of retaliation was seen not to be suitable for the 
multilateral trading system, to date, the remedy has remained unappealing to 
 
212 Jackson, John H., The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 42 at Pg. 108 
213 Ibid, at Pg. 108 
214 Trimble Philip .R, “International Trade and the Rule of Law,” Michigan Law Review 83 (1985) at Pg.  
      1016 
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developing and least developed Members, and yet, no motion is made to improve 
the system. 
 
As noted by Robert Hudec, “Larger and more powerful countries, those 
accustomed to living by rules slanted in their favor, are likely to aim for a 
somewhat less balanced result. For them, the optimal remedy package will be one 
that works well against others but not so well against themselves. This tendency 
also has to be considered in explaining why WTO remedies are as they are.215”   
There should be more explicit procedures for compensatory measures, as 
suggested by history, sanctions and even compensation, have limited utility.  
More vital is the credibility and advisability of the panel reports in the face of the 
international community.  
 
A scholar suggests that international resolution of disputes, more so regarding 
economic matters, has as its prime objective neither ascertainment of right or 
wrong, nor establishment of responsibility of a particular nation, but instead the 
most rapid cessation of the violations. The author and others stress the vitality of 
diplomatic means and negotiating approaches to resolving disputes.216
 
 The above viewpoints however miss vital policy considerations and can be 
misleading.217 It is important to note that considerable utility exists in publicly 
designating or threatening to do so the “wrong doer” in an international dispute, 
especially if the validity of the process that determines the wrong doing is widely 
accepted. Most significant however, is that in most cases, it is not the resolution 
of the specific dispute at hand that is most vital, rather, the efficient and just 
future functioning of the overall system that is the primary goal of a dispute 
settlement procedure. 
 
215 Quoted by Shaffer Gregory, How to make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing  
     Countries; Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 211 at Pg. 59 
216Giorgio Malinverni, Le Reglement Des Differends Dans Les Organisations Internationales Economiques.  
     Leiden: Sijthoff, 1974, at Pg. 106. See also Edmond McGovern, International Trade Regulation. Exeter:  
     Globefield Press, 2nd Ed, 1986 at Pg. 32 
217 Jackson John H. The World Trading System, Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 42 at Pg. 137 
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When all is said and done, it is still vital to stress that a strong legal system could 
be seen to jeopardize national sovereignty of Member States, and this could cause 
further antagonism for the Multilateral Trading System. It would therefore benefit 
all concerned to tread cautiously whilst proposing and indeed implementing 
suitable changes to the WTO dispute settlement system, for as noted,218 WTO law 
arguably provides for only limited remedies because governments, and in 
particular powerful governments, have not wanted WTO law to be that binding. 
 
In recommending that prospective remedies should be provided for under the 
DSU, care must be taken in conferring with principles of Public International Law 
by taking into account the basic principles and objectives of the multilateral 
trading system, lest the character of the WTO system as an international 
establishment in which Members have bound themselves for a specific purpose 
may be derailed. At the examination of the provisions of the DSU, there is no 
lacuna in the law; indeed the Contracting Members merely intended that the 
remedies under the DSU would not be retrospective, but rather prospective, 
maintaining a balance of rights and obligations between Parties, to preserve future 
trading opportunities rather than address past injuries.  
 
In one considered case, Australia – Automotive Leather implementation 
report,219 where retrospective remedies were considered, the dispute involved a 
complaint by the US against a grant of 30M Australian Dollars (A$) (US$15M) 
and a concessional loan of A$ 25M provided by the Australian Federal 
Government to the Howe Leather Company. The panel found the grant to be a 
prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1 (a) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
countervailing measures220and recommended that Australia withdraw the subsidy. 
The Panel ruled that Australia had failed to properly ‘withdraw the subsidy’ by 
 
218 Shaffer Gregory, How to make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries, 
Op. Cit, Supra, footnote 162, at Pg. 66 
219 WTO Article 21.5 Panel Report, Australia- Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of 
Automotive Leather (‘Automotive Leather’), WT/DS126/RW, adopted 11 February 2000  
220 GATT Secretariat, The results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Legal 
Texts (Geneva, 1994), at Pg. 231 
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not retrospectively recalling the $30M grant provided to the company. This ruling 
was highly criticized by the WTO Member States as it purported to grant a 
retrospective remedy221and comments were made to the effect that WTO 
Members should treat the panel ruling as a one- time aberration of no precedential 
value.222
 
As depicted from above, the Members of the WTO never intended to remedy past 
injury, rather to maintain a balance of concessions between parties. Article 19.1 of 
the DSU provides that in the event of a finding of the panel of a WTO 
inconsistency, the panel or the Appellate Body shall recommend that the 
responding Member bring the measure into conformity. Article 3.7 of the DSU 
provides that the first objective of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism is ‘to secure 
the withdrawal of the measures concerned’.  
 
The foregoing provisions ascribe panel or Appellate Body recommendations as 
being purely prospective, interpretation of the above provisions otherwise, would 
be an express violation of the Customary International Law principle expressed in 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties, which requires a 
treaty to be interpreted ‘in good faith’ in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. 
 
Having amply established that the WTO dispute settlement understanding 
remedies were merely meant to be prospective and not retrospective, the remedial 
object and purpose of the system should be altered to impute responsibility upon 
offending Members, not only to maintain a balance of rights and obligations of 
the parties, but also to cater for past injuries occasioned to complainant Members 
as provided for under the principles of Public International Law. 
 
 
221 Gavin Goh & Andreas R. Ziegler, Op. Cit., Supra, footnote 147 at pg. 547 
222 Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, 11 February 2000, WT/DSB/M/75 at Pg. 8 
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In conclusion, the study revealed that the remedy of retaliation has generated 
great dissatisfaction amongst the WTO Membership, especially the developing 
and least developed countries. To a great extent, the respondents noted how 
unfeasible retaliation as a remedy is, and recommended that a mechanism should 
be devised to improve retaliation as a remedy, as it does not fulfill the aims and 
objectives of the WTO. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Esteemed Respondent, my name is Clare Olaki; I am a student at the University of the 
Western Cape, studying towards a Masters’ degree in International Trade and Investment 
Law in Africa. As a prerequisite for completion of my LL.M, I am required to submit a 
research paper. I am carrying out research and my thesis is entitled: The Feasibility of 
Retaliation as a Trade Remedy under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
I shall highly appreciate your cooperation in the completion of this questionnaire. 
 
Retaliation is a last resort trade remedy under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). However, much is debated about the efficacy 
of Retaliation as a remedy under the Dispute Settlement System, whether it fulfills the 
objectives and purpose of the WTO and the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
respectively. The main objectives of the State parties under the WTO in relevant part, is 
depicted in the preamble to the Marrakech Agreement as: “…entering into reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations. ” The main objective of the WTO DSU according to   Article 3:2 is: “The 
Dispute Settlement System (DSS) of the WTO is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system”. 
 
This research is for study purposes only, and information provided shall be treated 
confidentially, unless prior consent for disclosure has been obtained from respondents. 
The major aim of this study is to provide practical recommendations to the adjustment of 
the WTO dispute settlement system trade remedies. An electronic copy of the research 
paper shall be availed to interested respondents after successful completion of the 
research. 
  
With the above brief background, your cooperation and detailed answers will be highly 
appreciated 
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1. To what extent does retaliation as a remedy succeed in fulfilling the objectives of 
the WTO and the DSU respectively? 
 
2. Does retaliation as a remedy fulfill the interests of all the member states, that is, 
developed, developing and least developed countries? 
(a) If it does, how? 
 
(b) If it does not, why not? 
 
(c) Is there a justification for keeping retaliation as a remedy under the WTO? 
 
3.  Is there a mechanism for improving retaliation as a remedy? If yes, how? 
 
4. Are there other remedies that are more feasible than retaliation? If yes, what 
difficulties do you envisage in enforcing the proposed remedies?       
 
5. What needs to be done in order to make the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
useful to all Member States whilst still fulfilling the WTO objectives? 
 
6. Additional general information and comments about the implementation of the 
WTO Panel or Appellate Body decisions. 
 
7. Kindly indicate which sector you are working with: 
(a) Government (Department) 
(b) Private Sector 
(c) Non governmental Organization 
(d) Civil Society 
 
 
Thank You 
 
 
